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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2006, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its second decision in five years concerning the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).1  Section 404 
gives the Corps discretionary power, through a permitting process, 
to allow or disallow the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
“waters of the United States” by private individuals and companies.2  
Rapanos v. United States3 involves the filling of wetlands for 
commercial purposes, as do the only other two Supreme Court 
decisions involving section 404.4 
The issue in Rapanos has been one of the most litigated in the 
short thirty-five year history of the CWA—to what extent may the 
Corps assert its regulatory jurisdiction?  In other words, how far did 
Congress intend the term “waters of the United States” to reach?  
The constitutional limit to the power that Congress may delegate to 
the Corps extends no further than the limitations of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause,5 which forms the basis for the Executive’s 
regulatory power over pollution in general.  Before Rapanos and its 
predecessor five years earlier, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),6 it seems 
that most federal judges—district court and circuit court alike—
would have interpreted the language of the CWA broadly to extend 
all the way to the limits of the Commerce Clause.  A small but vocal 
minority of judges, however, disputed this interpretation and would 
have strictly construed the CWA’s language to limit the Corps’s 
jurisdiction to only those waters that are truly interstate.  What is 
undisputed is the fact that after Rapanos and SWANCC, a majority of 
Supreme Court Justices will not allow an overly broad 
                                                          
 1. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). 
 2. The term “waters of the United States” and the term “navigable waters” 
are used interchangeably in this Article because the CWA gives them the same 
meaning.  See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 3. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
 4. The other two Supreme Court cases discussing section 404 of the CWA 
are United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), and Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 
159 (2001).  The later case is generally referred to as the “SWANCC” case and both 
are discussed in depth below. 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 6. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
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interpretation of the CWA.  The result being, from an ecological 
standpoint, the loss of even more wetlands to agriculture and 
development because those wetlands that are not under federal 
control fall to the states for regulation, and the states have 
historically done a poor job at preserving wetlands. 
This Article will show, through a historical analysis of federal 
waters/wetlands jurisprudence, that Rapanos and SWANCC were 
wrongly decided, representing a sudden shift away from prior 
waters/wetlands precedent that sought to give maximum control to 
the Executive to prevent pollution and preserve our nation’s 
aquatic ecological resources.  This Article will first present some 
background information relating to wetlands, with an added focus 
on Minnesota wetlands.7  Second, it will discuss the early expansion 
of the term “waters of the United States” as the basis for federal 
control over water pollution.8  Third, this Article will show how the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA), through a series of 
increasingly liberal court of appeals and Supreme Court decisions, 
came to be used for the regulation of industrial water pollution, 
even though it was initially passed only to prevent navigational 
blockages in open waters.9  Fourth, this Article will outline the CWA 
provisions that are pertinent to wetlands, discussing them in the 
context of overdue congressional action on the need for 
comprehensive water pollution legislation, action which the 
judiciary had been pressing for all along.10  Fifth, this Article will 
analyze the continuing trend in the judiciary to liberally construe 
waters/wetlands legislation, but now with the CWA rather than the 
RHA as the basis for these decisions.11  Finally, this Article will 
discuss and critique the two recent “less pioneering” Supreme 
Court decisions in light of all this progressive history and 
precedent, with particular attention paid to the Rapanos decision.12 
II. WETLANDS 
A.  Nationally 
Since early in our nation’s history, the American pioneer spirit 
                                                          
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 10. See infra Part IV.A. 
 11. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 12. See infra Parts V, VI. 
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has driven our people to tame the wilderness and reclaim and 
exploit our natural resources to their fullest extent.  Such activities 
include logging and deforestation, river diversion and damming, 
mining and excavation, and wetlands reclamation in order to 
provide fertile lands for farming and solid ground for construction 
and development.  With respect to wetlands, nearly fifty percent of 
their former acreage has been lost to human activity.13 
1. Old Views 
Until the last few decades, many believed that wetlands served 
no useful purpose, and that the public interest was best served by 
draining and filling these lands.  In fact, the common mindset in 
the nineteenth century was that wetlands were “bogs of treachery, 
mires of despair, homes of pests, and refuges for outlaw and 
rebel.”14  Congress also seems, at one point, to have shared this 
belief, indicated by the passage of the Swamp Lands Acts in the 
mid-nineteenth century, which granted nearly sixty-five million 
acres of federal lands to the states for the purposes of reclamation 
in order to prevent the spread of insect-borne disease and to 
promote the expansion of agriculture.15 
2. Modern Views 
But as science and society progressed, the “noxious and 
useless” reputation of wetlands began to be called into question—
initially by backwoods hunters and gatherers who recognized that 
sharply declining populations of duck and geese depended on this 
type of habitat for their survival.16  In the fifty years between 1934 
and 1984, over 3.5 million acres of wetlands were preserved 
through the Duck Stamp Act—a federal initiative designed to 
create a source of revenue from waterfowl hunters and other 
outdoor enthusiasts.17  During those same years, Americans began 
to recognize the value of environmental causes in general, 
including wetlands, as indicated by the reservation and withdrawal 
of millions of federal acres for national parks and monuments.18  As 
                                                          
 13. David C. Forsberg, The Minnesota Wetland Conservation Act of 1991: 
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1992). 
 14. Id. at 1025. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1026. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See AmericanFrontiers.net, Public Lands Timeline, http://www.american 
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knowledge of wetlands increased, their impressive water 
purification and flood-control qualities came to be recognized.  In 
fact, wetlands are often described as the “kidneys of the landscape” 
for their ability to clean polluted waters that pass through them.19 
[Wetlands] contribute directly to the water quality of lakes 
and streams by acting as buffers, filtering the water which 
ultimately passes into them . . . .  Wetlands also retain 
rainwater and snowmelt, permitting them to percolate 
into underground aquifers.  In the absence of [wetlands], 
the water would rapidly find its way into streams and rivers 
and ultimately to the sea, where its availability to human 
communities is lost.  Because of their ability to retain 
water, wetlands are indispensable to effective flood 
control.  Flood damage is extremely costly, and wetland 
retention and restoration are cost-effective methods of 
reducing the damage.20 
In recognition of their many values, wetlands gained protection 
under a host of state and federal laws. 
3. The 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
The first of these laws was the 1948 Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA).21  But this law and its subsequent 
amendments in the 1950s and 1960s were largely ineffective 
because they only set forth a general plan for pollution control, 
entrusting the states to implement and police the plan at their 
discretion.22  And the states, more interested in their own 
economies and less interested in pollution at a national level, 
largely disregarded the FWPCA because its advisory nature lacked 
incentive for them to act.23 
As a result, many lakes, rivers, and wetlands were polluted well 
                                                                                                                                  
frontiers.net/timeline (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (providing a timeline from    
1492–1976). 
 19. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1027. 
 20. Id. at 1027–28.  Wetlands also support a large variety of endangered 
species; some thirty-five percent of them depend on wetlands for their survival.  Id. 
at 1028 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4401 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
 22. JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 5–6 (2005).  The 1948 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, due to federalism concerns, allowed the 
states to take the primary role in regulation and enforcement.  See ROBIN KUNDIS 
CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE 
PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 12 (2004).  See also Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act § 1, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
 23. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
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beyond levels safe for human consumption or recreation—a fact 
exemplified by two infamous events in 1969: sparks from a passing 
train set the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, on fire for over 
thirty minutes,24 and a Union Oil Company drilling platform 
located six miles of the coast of Santa Barbara, California suffered a 
blowout resulting in the release of 200,000 gallons of crude oil into 
the Pacific Ocean.25  These circumstances and events, combined 
with a new “environmental consciousness”—symbolized by the first 
Earth Day in 1970—finally prompted Congress to act in a 
comprehensive manner and on a national level to protect our 
aqueous resources.26 
4. The Clean Water Act 
The 1972 amendment to the FWPCA, commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act,27 is now the primary federal statute that regulates 
pollution and other discharges into the waters of the United 
States.28  The goal of the CWA is to “protect the quality of lakes, 
streams, and other waters for recreational use, for maintenance of 
aquatic life,”29 and to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”30  But as a federal 
statute, the CWA cannot reach all waters and wetlands; the states 
still have a large, although somewhat circumscribed, role to play in 
the preservation and regulation of wetlands.  In fact, the CWA 
specifically states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan 
the development . . . of land and water resources.”31 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 6–7; OhioHistoryCentral.org, Cuyahoga River Fire, http://www.ohio 
historycentral.org/entry.php?rec=1642 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). 
 25. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6; Santa Barbara Wildlife Care Network 
Online, Santa Barbara’s 1969 Oil Spill, http://www.sbwcn.org/spill.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2007). 
 26. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6. 
 27. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).  The Clean 
Water Act was amended in 1977 and in 1987; the current version is codified at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
 28. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Clean Water Act § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 31. Id. § 101(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  The importance of this section is hotly 
debated.  Those who would seek to limit the Corps’s jurisdiction—the plurality 
opinion in Rapanos, for example—often point to this section for support.  See 
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223–24 (2006).  Others assert that this 
section is merely Congress’s recognition that the Commerce Clause cannot cover 
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B. In Minnesota 
Minnesota has the fourth-largest wetland area in the United 
States, surpassed only by Alaska, Florida, and Louisiana, and it has 
consistently been in the forefront of wetlands regulation and 
preservation.32  There are 9.285 million acres of recognized 
wetlands in the state of Minnesota.33  But over fifty-two percent of 
the state’s original wetlands have been lost due to development, 
making way for houses, roads, and farmland.34  The remaining 
wetlands include “prairie potholes,” which are primarily freshwater 
marshes formed by glaciers during the Pleistocene epoch.35  Prairie 
potholes are some of the most important wetlands in the world 
because three-quarters of all North American waterfowl originate 
from these regions.36 
In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature acted to pass a new 
comprehensive wetlands bill, entitled the Minnesota Wetland 
Conservation Act (WCA).37  The WCA: 
prohibits the draining and filling of protected wetlands 
unless replaced by restored or created wetlands of equal 
public value under an approved replacement plan.  It 
designates as “scientific and natural areas” about 150,000 
acres of specifically described peatlands in northern 
Minnesota.  The [WCA] restricts a variety of activities in 
peatlands including construction of new drainage systems, 
exploration for and removal of peat, oil, gas, and other 
minerals and commercial logging.38 
With the passage of the WCA, Minnesota adopted a “no net loss” 
policy in regard to its wetlands.39  Judicial decisions over the past 
                                                                                                                                  
all waters, and that certain waters still need to be regulated solely by the states.  See 
id. at 2246 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 32. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1023. 
 33. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Online, Wetlands, http:// 
www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
 34. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Online, Wetlands: Benefits 
of Wetlands, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/benefits.html (last visited Feb. 
13, 2007). 
 35. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1023.  In the United States, prairie potholes 
are found in North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Minnesota; in Canada, 
prairie potholes are found in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.  Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 1991 Minn. Laws 2794, ch. 354 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of MINN. STAT.  chs. 84 and 103A (2006)). 
 38. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1022–23.  Peatlands are another common type 
of wetlands. 
 39. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: WETLANDS REGULATION 
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thirty years accord with this policy.40 
But a frequently cited flaw in the WCA is the fact that its 
jurisdiction does not apply to artificial wetlands, only naturally 
occurring ones.41  This flaw exists due to pre-WCA case law that 
interprets wetlands as including only “natural” waters.42  It is in this 
natural/artificial wetlands jurisdictional distinction that Minnesota 
state law differs from federal law (i.e. the CWA),43 and it is one of 
the main reasons why an understanding of federal law is critically 
important to practitioners in Minnesota who are working in the 
various areas of land regulation.  Furthermore, even where 
Minnesota state regulations are applicable, the CWA also requires a 
parallel permitting process for any development or filling of 
wetlands that are also federal waters of the United States.44 
Therefore, in order to develop a full picture of federal 
wetlands regulation, this Article begins with a discussion of 
jurisdictional issues as they relate to waters and water pollution 
generally, starting with the departure from English precedent in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Although antiquated and 
largely superseded by statute and subsequent case law, these early 
                                                                                                                                  
IN MINNESOTA 11 (2003), http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/wetlands/publications/ 
MNRegulations.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Christopher J. Schulte, Minnesota 
Wetland Conservation Act of 1991: “Did Minnesota Miss the Boat to Protect Artificially 
Created Wetlands?”, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 439, 439 (1992). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Christenson, 417 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 1987) (restricting 
permit applicant from enlarging and rebuilding pre-existing wetland drainage 
system); County of Freeborn by Teveson v. Byrson, 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316 
(1976) (enjoining construction of highway where alternate route around wetland 
was available); In re Cent. Baptist Theological Seminary, 370 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985) (building of radio tower in wetland in detriment to wildlife habitat 
not permitted); State v. Drum, No. CX-92-922, 1998 WL 170118 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 14, 1998) (upholding conviction for violation of WCA cease-and-desist 
order). 
 41. See Schulte, supra note 39, at 439 (recommending amendments to the 
statute).  See also Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1052–57 (containing a further critique 
of the WCA). 
 42. See Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Mahnomen County Hearings Unit, 407 
N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (distinguishing between artificially and 
naturally created wetlands); Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Todd County Hearings Unit, 
356 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting the designation of three sites in 
central Minnesota as wetlands because they were artificially created and enlarged).  
See also Schulte, supra note 39, at 459–60 (“[These] holdings are unequivocal that 
wetlands artificially created receive no protection under the public waters statutes.  
The state, therefore, can claim no jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 43. The CWA does not make this distinction.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
Therefore, even if a Minnesota wetland is not subject to state regulation, it may 
still be subject to federal regulation. 
 44. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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decisions shed light on how liberal judicial decision making formed 
the basis for the expansion of legislation and regulation pertaining 
to wetlands; in other words, they are the beginning in a long line of 
cases that suggest Rapanos and SWANCC were wrongly decided. 
III. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER WATERS AND 
WETLANDS 
While the CWA represents the federal government’s most 
marked policy shift in water pollution and wetlands regulation,45 it 
is certainly not our nation’s first effort to control what is put into 
our waters.  Since 1871, Congress and the federal courts have been 
steadily expanding the body of law concerning what type of waters 
and wetlands are subject to regulation.46  Before this expansion 
occurred, American courts had followed English common law, 
which held that a country’s waters were only those that were subject 
to the ebb and flow of the tide.47  In the United States, this rule 
largely limited federal jurisdiction to coastal waters and the Great 
Lakes.  At that time in history, though, water pollution was only 
starting to become a problem.  Accordingly, early decisions dealing 
with jurisdictional issues are largely based on commerce in the 
traditional sense of the word, as seen in the following case. 
A. The Term “Waters of the United States” Gains New Meaning 
In The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court made a definite shift 
away from English common law and towards a more expanded 
interpretation of what constitutes “navigable waters of the United 
States.”48  The Daniel Ball was a cargo steamer that carried goods 
                                                          
 45. “The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
represented a change in the regulatory philosophy from [inconsistent and often 
non-existent] water-quality standards established by states to a [national] ‘clean 
waters’ approach.”  GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6–7.  For example, a specific 
federal-level objective of the CWA was the elimination of all pollutant discharges 
by 1985.  Id. at 7.  This obviously did not happen, but it represents the spirit of the 
legislation, which the Supreme Court in recent years seems to have forgotten.  See 
discussion infra Part V. 
 46. This expansion closely parallels the Supreme Court’s increasing 
willingness to grant Congress regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.  See 
generally E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981). 
 47. See, e.g., Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B.) 
(“For wherever a [water] flows and reflows it is in the nature of a highway, and is 
common to all.”). 
 48. 77 U.S. 557, 563 (10 Wall. 1870). 
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up and down the Grand River, which was navigable wholly within 
the state of Michigan for approximately forty miles.49  A federal 
statute passed in 1838 required a permit for any ships carrying 
cargo or passengers in any navigable waters of the United States.50  
The Court, holding that a permit was required for transit along the 
Grand River, extended the regulatory power of the government to 
include waters that “form in their ordinary condition by 
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway 
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or 
foreign countries.”51  In other words, the Court held that when 
purely intrastate transit of goods has the potential to affect 
interstate commerce through continuous transit connections, 
federal regulation is proper under the Commerce Clause.52 
B. The Rivers and Harbors Act 
With this new jurisdictional power, courtesy of the Supreme 
Court, Congress was able to pass a law that limited discharges into 
these new federally controlled waters.  In 1899, Congress passed the 
Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), which was primarily designed to 
aide navigation by preventing obstructions from being discharged 
into waterways.53  And for the first few decades following its passage, 
that is exactly for what the RHA was used.54  But with the industrial 
revolution and the increase in factories situated along rivers and 
lakes, water pollution was quickly becoming more prevalent.  It was 
during this time when the judiciary made its first pioneering step 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 564. 
 50. Id.; see also 5 Stat. 304 (1838). 
 51. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. 
 52. This holding was important when the Corps (many decades later) first 
sought to regulate intrastate tributaries of navigable interstate rivers by reason of 
their “continuous connections.”  See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.b (regulation of 
wetlands adjacent to tributaries). 
 53. Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 407 (2000)): 
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter 
of any kind or description whatever . . . [but] the Secretary of the 
Army . . . may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in 
navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under conditions to be 
prescribed by him . . . . 
Id.  Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is commonly known as the Refuse 
Act. 
 54. See, e.g., Corrigan Transit Co. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 137 F. 851 (7th 
Cir. 1905) (shipping line affected by the alteration of the current in a canal, due 
to structural changes made by the Sanitary District). 
11
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forward.  Although nowhere in the language of the RHA did 
Congress provide authority to control water pollution, a series of 
judicial decisions from the 1930s to the 1960s interpreted the RHA 
as impliedly supplying this power.  In essence, congressional intent 
took a back seat to an increasing concern for the quality of our 
nation’s water resources, with the federal judiciary at the wheel.55 
C. Stretching the Rivers and Harbors Act to Its Breaking Point 
Consequently, until the passage of the CWA, the United States 
prosecuted an increasing number of RHA violations that had 
nothing to do with navigation per se.56  The judicially powered 
expansion of the RHA’s use reached its peak when the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed, in two famous cases, what had become a 
sizeable body of law in the lower courts.57  The Court interpreted 
the RHA not just as a navigational aide, but also as a tool to combat 
industrial pollution. 
1. United States v. Republic Steel Corp. 
The first case, United States v. Republic Steel Corp., involved iron 
mills on the Calumet River near Gary, Indiana.58  It was undisputed 
in the case that the only discharge from the mills was in the liquid 
state, but the Court took an expansive reading of section 10 of the 
RHA, dismissing the argument that the word “‘obstruction’ means 
some kind of structure.”59  “We read the [RHA] charitably in light 
                                                          
 55. The early cases under the Refuse Act are regarded as the first attempts to 
use federal statutes to control water pollution.  See CRAIG, supra note 22, at 10; 
GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 5. 
 56. CRAIG, supra note 22, at 10.  Even as early as 1936, in the case La Merced, 
which involved an oil spill on Lake Washington near Seattle, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals liberally interpreted the RHA and saw “no reason for limiting 
‘refuse matter of any kind or description whatever’ to such refuse matter only as 
would impede or obstruct navigation.  The plain intention of Congress was to 
prohibit the discharge into navigable water of any material . . . .” La Merced, 84 
F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 57. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 58. 362 U.S. 482, 483 (1960).  The mills acquired water intake from the river, 
used it in the manufacturing process, filtered it, and then discharged it back into 
the river.  Id. But minute suspended industrial solids, mostly iron, remained in the 
effluent.  Id.  The only “obstruction” created by this process was the gradual 
shallowing of the river, at a rate of approximately one foot per decade.  See id.  
483–84. 
 59. Id. at 486.  Section 10 of the RHA is very similar to section 13: “the 
creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the 
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is hereby 
12
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of the purpose to be served.  The philosophy of the statement of 
Mr. Justice Holmes . . . that ‘[a] river is more than an amenity, it is 
a treasure,’ forbids a narrow, cramped reading either of [Section] 
13 or of [Section] 10.”60  Furthermore, the Court held that 
deference should be given to the judgment of the administrative 
agency in charge of maintaining navigable river ways—the Army 
Corps of Engineers—to determine what acts constitute a violation 
of the RHA.61 
2. United States v. Standard Oil Co. 
Six years after deciding Republic Steel, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to using a liberal construction of the 
RHA to abate pollution.62  United States v. Standard Oil Co. involved 
the accidental discharge of aviation fuel into the St. Johns River in 
central Florida.63  The United States brought a suit against 
Standard Oil under section 13 of the RHA, claiming that the      
100-octane fuel was “refuse matter.”64  Clearly, an environmental, 
rather than navigational motive was behind the prosecution.  
Justice Douglas even went so far in his opinion as to admit that the 
case was not of the type of violation that Congress had originally 
intended to prevent, yet, following the “spirit” of the precedent in 
previous decades, he ruled in favor of the government nevertheless, 
stating: 
                                                                                                                                  
prohibited . . . .”  33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).  When read in relation to section 13, the 
original intent of Congress that this statute be primarily a navigation aide is 
revealed. 
 60. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 491 (quoting Holmes, J., in New Jersey v. New 
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931)).  New Jersey v. New York involved an attempt by New 
York to divert a significant portion of the Delaware River. 283 U.S. 336, 341 
(1931). 
 61. The case record reveals the Corps’s extensive involvement in policing the 
Calumet since 1909.  See Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 491 n.5.  The Court, recognizing 
that the Corps, as the administrative agency in charge of enforcing the RHA, 
having much more experience dealing with and interpreting the statute, stated 
that “[a]ny doubts are resolved by a consistent administrative construction which 
refused to give immunity to industrial wastes resulting in the deposit of solids. . . .  
This long-standing administrative construction, while not conclusive of course, is 
entitled to ‘great weight . . . .’”  Id. at 490, 491 n.5.  This prescient statement 
foreshadowed the Court’s opinion in another famous administrative law case.  See 
discussion infra note 112.  It is also a concept that has become largely lost in the 
recent SWANCC and Rapanos cases.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 62. CRAIG, supra note 22, at 11. 
 63. 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966).  A dock-side shut-off valve had been negligently 
left open, causing the spill.  Id. 
 64. Id. 
13
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This case comes to us at a time in the Nation’s history 
when there is greater concern than ever over pollution—
one of the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to 
our lakes as well.  The crisis that we face in this respect 
would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing 
offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretching 
statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange 
conditions.  But whatever may be said of the rule of strict 
construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common 
sense, precedent, and legislative history.  We cannot 
construe § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act in a vacuum.65 
3. Moving Forward 
In light of these decisions, legal scholars and commentators 
found it curious that a nineteenth century statute was still being 
used to remedy water pollution issues,66 even after all of the 
amendments to the FWPCA.67  In fact, after the broad, reaching 
decisions in Standard Oil and Republic Steel, there was still much 
uncertainty as to the future enforcement of water pollution; in 
other words, could the judiciary stretch the RHA even further?68  
But any uncertainty was put to rest in 1972 with the passage of the 
CWA. 
IV. REGULATION OF WETLANDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Better late than never, it took Congress another six years after 
the decision in Standard Oil was announced before it passed the 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 225–26.  “[B]y the mid-1960s, the United States had firmly 
established its authority under the RHA ability to prevent pollution in the 
navigable waters.”  CRAIG, supra note 22, at 11. 
 66. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse 
Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1971) (noting 
“[t]hat the solons of the nineteenth century appear to have surpassed their 
modern successors in fashioning useful tools for combating water pollution is a 
curious commentary on the accidents of legal history and on the vitality of the 
current drive to secure water quality”). 
 67. Before Congress passed the CWA, the FWPCA had been amended in 
1952, 1956, 1961, 1965, 1966, and 1970.  See CRAIG, supra note 22, at 13–22 
(discussing in detail the various amendments). 
 68. Professor Rodgers discusses two hypothetical situations, the first involving 
aggressive prosecution of virtually all major contributors of industrial waste to 
navigable waters, and the second involving “[u]nprepared, uninspired, and 
disinterested [officials who perceive] the certification [or permit] as but another 
piece of paper to sign.”  See Rodgers, supra note 66, at 821. 
14
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CWA.69  With all of the strained applications of the RHA, it was a 
badly needed addition to federal law.  Serving a complex problem, 
the CWA is a complex piece of legislation, containing hundreds of 
provisions, regulations, and definitions—a full treatment of its text 
is beyond the scope of this Article.70 
A. Statutory Language 
1. The Corps’s Power 
The CWA gives regulatory power to the Corps through a 
discretionary permitting process set forth in section 404.  When the 
Corps has jurisdiction over a particular area, “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person [is] unlawful” without a section 404 
permit.71  But the Corps “may issue [section 404] permits, after 
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.”72  This permitting process can be very long, involved, 
and expensive.  As Justice Scalia commented: 
In deciding whether to grant or deny a [section 404] 
permit, the [Corps] exercises the discretion of an 
enlightened despot, relying on such factors as 
“economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, 
the needs and welfare of the people.”  The average 
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and 
$271,596 in completing the process, and the average 
                                                          
 69. Under the FWPCA, only one case was prosecuted in the twenty-four years 
between 1948 and 1972.  GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6.  The FWPCA was 
initially designed to be implemented by the states, with only limited federal 
support in financing and research.  See id. at 5–6.  Although the FWPCA was 
amended several times before 1972, no adequate federal enforcement was ever 
included, and it remained basically toothless.  See id. at 6.  Thus, the CWA is 
generally considered to be the first legislative effort to specifically combat water 
pollution, lightening the burden on the court system from strained applications of 
the RHA.  See id. at 5–6. 
 70. This Article has heretofore discussed water pollution generally in an 
effort to show the overall relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.  
But after Congress passed the CWA, wetlands, rivers, lakes, and other areas all 
furcated into their own respective branches of law.  Because the Corps has 
jurisdiction over the filling of wetlands with dredged or fill material, and because 
only wetlands are involved in the Rapanos decision and the sequence of decisions 
that led up to it, this Article will, from this point forward, focus its discussion on 
the Corps’s permitting process that is required to dredge or fill wetlands. 
 71. Clean Water Act, tit. III, § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) 
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)). 
 72. Id. § 404(a) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000)). 
15
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applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and 
$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design 
changes.  “[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the 
private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.”  
These costs cannot be avoided . . . .73 
Often times, in processing a permit application, the Corps requires 
that the applicant engage in wetland restoration projects so that 
the potential impact on wetlands is minimized.74 
2. ”Navigable Waters” 
Just as with the RHA, the primary issue in Supreme Court cases 
addressing wetlands regulation under the CWA was the meaning of 
“navigable waters,” a term which Congress has defined as “the 
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”75  After 
passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted the traditional 
definition for the term navigable waters.76  But it soon became 
evident that this definition was clearly insufficient in light of the 
stated purpose of the CWA.77 
Recognizing this problem, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council brought suit against the Corps in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, arguing that the legislative history, 
historical circumstances, and judicial precedent under which the 
CWA was enacted mandated a broad interpretation of navigable 
waters, hence broad regulatory power over, among other things, 
                                                          
 73. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214–15 (2006) (quoting 33 
C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2004) and David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of 
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland 
Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 74–76, 81 (2002)) (citations omitted). 
 74. See EPA Wetland Regulatory Authority, Regulatory Requirements, http:// 
www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/reg_authority_pr.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 
2007) (describing the general principles that the Corps follows when issuing 
section 404 permits); see also EPA: River Corridor and Wetland Restoration, 
Principles for the Ecological Restoration of Aquatic Resources, http://www.epa. 
gov/owow/wetlands/restore/principles.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007). 
 75. Clean Water Act § 502(7) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)). 
 76. This definition is traditional in the Daniel Ball sense of the word—waters 
that are navigable in fact or readily susceptible to being rendered so.  See 39 Fed. 
Reg. 12115, 12119 (Apr. 3, 1974).  The text of the Corps’s initial definition stated:  
“Navigable waters of the United States are those waters which are presently or have 
been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of 
interstate or foreign commerce.”  37 Fed. Reg. 18290 (Sept. 9, 1972). 
 77. The goal of the CWA is to “protect the quality of lakes, streams, and other 
waters for recreational use, for maintenance of aquatic life.”  GROSS & DODGE, 
supra note 22, at 1. 
16
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wetlands.78  On motion for summary judgment, the district court 
held that “Congress, by defining the term ‘navigable waters’ . . . to 
mean ‘the waters of the United States,’ . . . asserted federal 
jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent 
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”79  
Furthermore, it held that the Corps was without power to amend or 
change the statutory definition through its own regulations, in 
derogation of its responsibilities under the CWA.80  The court 
ordered the Corps to rescind its current regulations, and write and 
publish new regulations within thirty days that “clearly recogniz[e] 
the full regulatory mandate of the [CWA].”81 
The result of the Callaway decision was a revised set of 
regulations in 1975 and 1977 that dramatically increased the 
jurisdiction of the Corps in regard to “navigable waters.”  These 
revised regulations extended the definition of “the waters of the 
United States” to the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power as 
it was then understood.82 
                                                          
 78. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686     
(D. D.C. 1975) (the defendants were Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, Lt. 
Gen. William C. Gribble, and Secretary of the Army, Howard H. Callaway). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  The Corps chose to accept this ruling and it did not appeal the order. 
 82. Immediately after the Callaway ruling, the Corps took the direction of the 
judge seriously and amended their regulations drastically—“navigable waters” 
would now include: 
[a]ll artificially created channels and canals used for recreational or 
other navigational purposes that are connected to other navigable waters, 
. . . [a]ll tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to their 
headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark, . . . [and] 
[f]reshwater wetlands including marshes, shallows, swamps and, similar 
areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters and that 
support freshwater vegetation. 
40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (July 25, 1975).  Two years later, the definition of navigable 
waters was further extended to include: “[a]ll other waters of the United States . . . 
such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and 
other waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to 
navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or destruction of which 
could affect interstate commerce.”  42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (July 19, 1977).  With 
respect to these new regulations, Justice Scalia later commented, in a criticizing 
tone, that 
immense expansion of federal regulation of land use . . . has occurred 
under the [CWA]. . . .  In the last three decades, the Corps and the 
[EPA] have interpreted their jurisdiction over “the waters of the United 
States” to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United 
States—including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the 
lower 48 States. 
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3. Congressional Acquiescence to the New Definition of Navigable 
Waters 
In 1977, critics of the CWA who felt that the Corps had too 
much jurisdiction, especially after the 1977 regulations were 
adopted, attempted to insert limitations in the CWA amendments 
of that year.83  Debate on the proposal centered largely around 
wetlands preservation: those who supported the plan argued that 
the Corps’s new regulations far exceeded what Congress had 
intended in 1972, while opponents of the plan argued that a 
narrower definition of navigable waters would exclude vast 
stretches of crucial wetlands to the detriment of the environment.84  
The House of Representatives passed the amendment, while the 
Senate rejected it; the Conference Committee eventually adopted 
the Senate approach, and efforts to narrow the definition of 
navigable waters were abandoned.85 
Perhaps this outcome was luck, or perhaps a majority of 
Congress decided to take a cue from what the judiciary had been 
doing over the past fifty years and used their power with the 
purpose of bettering the environment in mind.  The Conference 
Report represented the sentiment of those environmentally 
conscious members of Congress who pushed to defeat the 
amendment: 
There is no question that the systematic destruction of the 
Nation’s wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological 
damage.  The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are 
the Nation’s most biologically active areas.  They 
represent a principal source of food supply . . . .  The 
unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which 
needs to be corrected and which implementation of 
section 404 has attempted to achieve.86 
                                                                                                                                  
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2212, 2215 (2006). 
 83. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985) 
(discussing the congressional record). 
 84. Id.  It is important to note that wetlands were not specifically enumerated 
in the text of the CWA.  But the Corps interpreted its new mandate to include 
wetlands as well, much like they had interpreted the RHA broadly before 1972.  
GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 77.  Cases discussing the applicability of the 
CWA to wetlands include Parkview Corp. v. Dep’t. of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 469            
F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Wis. 1979), and Track 12, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 618     
F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1985). 
 85. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136–37. 
 86. S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4336. 
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B. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 
It appeared that in the first few years after the CWA was in 
force, the liberal philosophy and pioneering tradition of 
construing environmental regulations to the broadest extent 
possible was continued by the Congress, the Corps, and by the 
lower federal courts.  The Supreme Court finally spoke in 1985, 
issuing its first wetlands opinion on the validity of the Corps’s 
policy87 that wetlands connected to “waters of the United States” 
also came under the purview of section 404 of the CWA.88 
1. Factual Background 
The defendant in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 
was a housing developer that owned approximately eighty acres of 
undeveloped marshland north of Detroit in Harrison Township, 
Macomb County, Michigan.89  The land in question was located one 
mile west of Lake Saint Clair and parallel to the Clinton River, both 
traditional navigable waters.90  Around seventy-five percent of the 
land was used as farmland before it was purchased by the 
defendant.91  Due to emergency measures taken by the Township 
during a period of heavy flooding in 1973, the drainage on 
portions of the land was destroyed.92  Several years later, Riverside 
Bayview contracted to have the land filled.93  It submitted a partially 
completed permit to the Corps in November of 1976.94  In 
December, Riverside Bayview began to place fill material on the 
                                                          
 87. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2004): 
The term “waters of the United States” means (1) All waters which are 
currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in 
interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate 
wetlands; (3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams . . . 
the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or 
foreign commerce . . . . 
Id. 
 88. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 121, 139. 
 89. Id. at 124 (summarizing the facts); United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 1984) (providing a more detailed 
description of the facts). 
 90. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 392. 
 91. Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 392. 
 92. Id. at 393.  The court does not place any significance on the fact that the 
wetland conditions on the Riverside Bayview land were exacerbated by municipal 
actions in response to flooding problems. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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property in preparation for construction of a housing 
development, and the Corps ordered it to cease and desist its 
activities.95  When Riverside Bayview continued nonetheless, 
litigation ensued.96 
2. Opinion per Justice White 
The Court’s opinion was an unqualified affirmance of the 
tradition and precedent of liberally interpreting waters/wetlands 
legislation.  First, the Court addressed the intent of Congress in 
passing the CWA by recognizing that: 
[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable 
to classify “lands,” wet or otherwise, as “waters.”  Such a 
simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the 
problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its 
authority under § 404(a) nor to the realities of the 
problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was 
intended to combat.97 
 Next, after analyzing the congressional record, the Court held 
that Congress had intended to “exercise its powers under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not 
be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that 
term.”98  The Court also noted that, from the record, it appeared 
that “the scope of the Corps’s asserted jurisdiction over wetlands 
was specifically brought to Congress’s attention, and Congress 
rejected measures designed to curb the Corps’s jurisdiction in large 
part because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be 
unduly hampered by a narrow definition of ‘navigable waters.’”99   
 Given this breadth granted by Congress, it was therefore 
“reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to 
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124–25; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 393.  
The district court enjoined Riverside from further filling without the Corps’s 
permission.  Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 393. 
 97. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132.  The Court also asserted that 
“[p]rotection of aquatic ecosystems . . . demand[s] broad federal authority to 
control pollution, for water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that 
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.”  Id. at 132–33 (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3742). 
 98. Id. at 133. 
 99. Id. at 137.  See also discussion supra Part IV.A.3. 
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defined.”100  On this point, the Court chose to quote from the 
EPA’s regulations on wetlands—the language speaks volumes as to 
the Court’s intent when framing this opinion: 
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution 
cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all 
waters that together form the entire aquatic system.  
Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of 
this part of the aquatic system . . . will affect the water 
quality of the other waters within that aquatic system. 
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction 
under section 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that 
form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to 
other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are 
part of this aquatic system.101 
Concluding the opinion, the Court held that the Corps had acted 
reasonably in requiring Riverside Bayview to seek a permit before 
filling its land.102 
C. The Judiciary Further Stretches the CWA post-Riverside Bayview 
With the broad language in Riverside Bayview concerning the 
extent of the Corps’s authority under section 404,103 it is no surprise 
that numerous cases were entertained before various federal circuit 
courts of appeals in the years that followed.  Of these cases, two 
stand out as particularly pioneering in the field of wetland 
regulation.  These two cases tested whether the judiciary would 
continue its trend of broadly interpreting Congress’s intent when it 
delegated authority to the Corps under the CWA.104 
                                                          
 100. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. 
 101. Id. at 133–34 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,128 (July 19, 1977)). 
 102. Id. at 139.  The Court took every opportunity to show that it was 
implementing Congress’s plan, not its own.  “[W]etlands are a concern of the 
Clean Water Act and [when] . . . defining the waters covered by the Act to include 
wetlands, the Corps is ‘implementing congressional policy rather than embarking 
on a frolic of its own.’”  Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
375 (1969)). 
 103. Noting that it was not called upon to address the extent of the Corps’s 
authority to regulate wetlands, the Court seemingly invited litigants to test this 
authority.  See 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.  And so they did. 
 104. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993); Hoffman 
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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1. United States v. Pozsgai 
a. Factual Background 
In United States v. Pozsgai,105 defendant Pozsgai began to fill 
concrete rubble, earth, and building scraps on his fourteen-acre lot 
in Pennsylvania in order to build on the property a garage that was 
needed to expand his truck repair business.106  Pozsgai had been 
warned by three separate engineers that the land would probably 
fall under the Corps’s definition of wetlands and had been advised 
to seek a permit.107  Pozsgai ignored not only the warnings of his 
engineers, but also several cease-and-desist letters that the Corps 
sent to him.  Pozsgai continued to fill his land.108   
The Corps filed suit against Pozsgai, and the district court 
granted a permanent injunction.109  There had been several surveys 
done on the wetlands in question—the Corps’s biologist and field 
investigator described the land “as ‘a forested wetland dominated 
by arrowwood’ and noted ‘areas of standing water were scattered 
throughout the site,’ and ‘a stream flows along the east border of 
the property and wetland and is a tributary to the Pennsylvania 
Canal,’” which the district court found to be a navigable water of 
the United States.110 
b. Extending Regulation to Tributaries and Their Adjacent 
Wetlands 
Pozsgai presented the court of appeals with a chance to weigh 
in on how far it felt that the Commerce Clause allowed the Corps 
to exercise wetland jurisdiction.  First, the Third Circuit recognized 
the holding in Riverside Bayview by reaffirming that 
[i]n determining the limits of its power to regulate 
discharges under the [CWA], the Corps must necessarily 
                                                          
 105. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 719. 
 106. Id. at 721–22. 
 107. Id. at 722.  In this case, the wetland in question was not adjacent to a 
navigable water of the United States like in Riverside Bayview—it was one step 
removed and adjacent to a tributary of a water of the United States.  See id. at 722 
n.1 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), (7) (1992) for the proposition that “[t]he 
regulations . . . cover wetlands adjacent to tributaries of waters used in interstate 
commerce”). 
 108. Id. at 722–23. 
 109. Id. at 724.  Pozsgai was also found guilty on related criminal charges.  Id. 
at 723. 
 110. Id. at 721–22, 730. 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/2
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:07:02 PM 
2007] RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES 1247 
choose some point at which water ends and land begins.  
Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy 
task: the transition from water to solid ground is not 
necessarily or typically an abrupt one . . . .  Where on this 
continuum to find the limit of “waters” is far from 
obvious.111 
 Second, the court of appeals recognized that courts should 
grant deference to agency interpretations, especially when the 
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, like the CWA, which 
addresses a scientifically complicated subject and has an intricate 
regulatory structure.112  Third, the court turned to Pozsgai’s claim 
that “the Corps’s adjacent wetlands regulations as applied to them 
violates the Commerce Clause.”113  But it dismissed Pozsgai’s 
argument by differentiating statutes that do require an 
individualized effect on interstate commerce from statutes that do 
not, such as the CWA.114  The court found that the CWA statutorily 
delegates authority to the Corps, which has determined that 
wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries of waters used in interstate 
commerce should be regulated at the federal level.115  Rather than 
individualizing the effects that Pozsgai’s actions had on the 
environment, the court treated his infraction as one in a class of 
activities, and the class as a whole generally requires permitting.116  
Finally, the court held that because the Corps’s “regulations reveal 
[that it] gave serious consideration to this issue, . . . [w]e cannot say 
                                                          
 111. Id. at 728 (discussing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 
121, 132 (1985)). 
 112. Id. at 729.  Agency deference is known as Chevron deference, after Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron 
involved an application of the Clean Air Act, and it was the first major case in 
administrative law to specifically grant executive agencies a large amount of 
autonomy to interpret congressional laws.  It also introduced the concept of 
judicial restraint into this field of law: “Judges are not experts in the field, and are 
not part of either political branch of the Government.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 113. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 733.  “We will uphold application of the law if there is 
a ‘rational basis’ for the congressional determination that the regulated activity 
‘affects interstate commerce,’ and if the means chosen to regulate the activity are 
reasonable.”  Id. (following the reasoning in Chevron). 
 114. Id. at 733–34. 
 115. Id. at 733. 
 116. Id. at 734.  The court here made a reference to what is known as the 
“cumulative effect” doctrine in Commerce Clause jurisprudence: “[W]here the 
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of the federal 
[commerce] power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances’ of the class.”  Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 
(1968)). 
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the Corps did not have a rational basis for this determination.”117  
Therefore, the Third Circuit upheld the Corps’s regulation that 
extended its jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to tributaries of 
waters of the United States against a Commerce Clause attack, and 
in doing so continued the tradition of liberally interpreting water 
and wetlands regulations. 
2. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency 
a. Factual Background 
The second pioneering case after Riverside Bayview was Hoffman 
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, a case addressing the extent to which the Corps 
could “stretch” in interpreting its own regulations.118  Hoffman 
Homes had begun to fill some of its land in the Village of Hoffman 
Estates, Illinois, without a section 404 permit.119  The land, a bowl-
shaped depression at the northeast border of the tract that covered 
approximately one acre and contained at least four different kinds 
of wetland vegetation, was not connected to any tributary or any 
other water of the United States.120  The Corps sought enforcement 
of the CWA against Hoffman because of its interpretation of a 
regulation that defined waters of the United States; the regulation 
provided for jurisdiction over “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate 
lakes, rivers, [or] streams . . . the use, degradation or destruction of 
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.”121  The Corps 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 734 n.11 (discussing how previous statutes and regulations 
culminated in the (then) current form of the Corps’s regulations concerning 
wetlands).  Although courts in the 1980s and 1990s continued the trend of 
increasing the Corps’s power to regulate wetlands, unlike Republic Steel and 
Standard Oil, these courts relied more on legislative history—which can be 
ambiguous—than on environmental policy arguments.  “The legislative history 
also demonstrates the significance and breadth of the term ‘navigable waters.’  
The Conference Report states: ‘[t]he conferees fully intend that the term 
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation . . . .’”  Id. at 726–27 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668).  Unfortunately, this shift in 
argument style may have eventually led to undesirable results.  See discussion infra 
Part V. 
 118. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 119. Id. at 257–58. 
 120. Id. at 258.  The land lay over 750 feet away from Poplar Creek, a tributary 
of a water of the United States.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 260 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1992)).  See also discussion 
infra note 148 (setting out the text of the Migratory Bird Rule as addressed by the 
Supreme Court in SWANCC). 
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interpreted this regulation “as allowing migratory birds to be [the] 
connection between a wetland and interstate commerce.”122 
b. Extending Regulation to Migratory Bird Habitats 
The Seventh Circuit first noted that the regulation does not 
require an actual effect on interstate commerce, only a potential 
effect.123  It then went on to state the rule that “[a]n agency’s 
construction of its own regulation binds a court in all but 
extraordinary cases” and that it must uphold the Corps’s 
interpretation “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.”124  With this in mind, the court held that it was 
reasonable to interpret the regulation as including wetlands where 
the only interstate commerce connection was migratory bird 
activity.125  Therefore, as far as the Seventh Circuit was concerned, 
the EPA and the Corps were free to interpret their own regulations 
very broadly. 
3. Questioning the Rapid Expansion of Power 
a. Arguments Against Pozsgai and Hoffman 
Although the decisions in Pozsgai and Hoffman represented the 
majority sentiment in the federal circuits post-Riverside Bayview,126 
                                                          
 122. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261.  In effect, the Corps sought to regulate 
any water, no matter how far disconnected to any navigable water of the United 
States, if birds, in the course of their yearly migration, used the water to alight. 
 123. Id. at 260.  In support of the interstate commerce connection, the court 
pointed to the fact that “[t]hroughout North America, millions of people annually 
spend more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory 
birds.  Yet, the cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced populations of many bird 
species and consequently the ability of people to hunt, trap, and observe those 
birds.”  Id. at 261. 
 124. Id. at 260. 
 125. Id. at 261.  Despite this holding, the court ruled against the EPA because 
it felt that the Corps had not proved that migratory birds did in fact visit the land 
in question.  “After April showers not every temporary wet spot necessarily 
becomes subject to governmental control.”  Id. at 262.  This statement was 
particularly telling.  Although the court here was willing to uphold the “Migratory 
Bird Rule” against an administrative challenge, the end result foreshadowed the 
Supreme Court’s sentiments several years later when the rule was considered 
before that Court.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 126. A notable exception to the expansion of Corps’s power under section 404 
was the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 
1997).  Following the recent Supreme Court holding in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (school-zone gun-control law not allowable under the Commerce 
Clause), Judge Niemeyer based the majority’s holding (2-1) on the Commerce 
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legal commentators presented a mixed view of the Corps’s 
jurisdiction.  They were concerned that Congress did not have the 
ability to regulate certain wetlands under the Commerce Clause, 
and they were also concerned that the Corps did not have the 
ability to interpret its mandate under the CWA as broadly as it had 
been.  After a thorough discussion of the term “navigable waters” as 
used by Congress over the past century, two respected 
commentators, James K. Jackson and William A. Nitze,127 concluded 
that: 
[L]egislative and judicial history concerning the term 
‘navigable waters’ indicate that the term ‘navigable 
waters,’ as used in [the CWA], was to include all waters 
covered by the expanded judicial interpretation of that 
term,128 but no others.  There is no indication in the 
language or history of the 1972 amendments that 
Congress was asserting jurisdiction over ground water or 
any other waters which were not in some way connected 
with waterborne commerce.129 
The authors’ proposition on this point is certainly plausible, 
considering the monumental change in regulation that Congress 
had enacted under the CWA.  It is important to recognize that 
although Congress legislates as a whole, it is not comprised of a sole 
voice.  Although many judicial opinions speak of congressional 
intent, often quoting various members of Congress in the majority 
whose record statements reflect the court’s position, it is probable 
that there would also be a significant number of members of 
Congress who did not agree with that proposition.  As the authors 
                                                                                                                                  
Clause, stating that the Corps did not possess the power to regulate otherwise 
isolated wetlands that were used as habitats for migratory birds.  Wilson, 133 F.3d at 
257. 
 127. James K. Jackson & William A. Nitze, Wetlands Protection Under Section 404 
of the Clean Water Act—The Riverside Bayview Decision, Its Past and Future, 7 PUB. LAND 
L. REV. 21, 26–34 (1986). 
 128. This language refers to a statement by representative Dingell while the 
CWA was in the congressional conference committee: 
[I]t is enough that the waterway serves as a link in the chain of commerce 
among the states as it flows in the various channels of transportation. . . .  
Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including 
mainstreams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes.  No longer 
are the old, narrow definitions of navigability . . . going to govern matters 
covered by this bill. 
Id. at 33. 
 129. Id.  Attempting to divine the elusive concept, they comment: “Clearly, a 
wholesale expansion of federal control over other waters was not then intended by 
Congress.”  Id. at 34. 
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point out, the definition of “navigable waters” after 1972 surely was 
meant to include more than the holding in decades-old opinions 
such as The Daniel Ball,130 but they do call into question the holdings 
in Pozsgai and Hoffman.131 
The authors also address the statement in Riverside Bayview 
concerning the acquiescence of Congress to the 1977 Corps’s 
interpretation of its mandate under section 404.  They argue that 
the legislative history of the 1977 amendment, although not 
concerning section 404, indicates that Congress tacitly accepted the 
Corps’s expanded interpretation of its mandate in 1975 following 
the Callaway decision, but not necessarily the further expansion in 
1977, upon which the Court in Riverside Bayview rested its 
decision.132  As discussed earlier, both the 1975 and the 1977 
versions of the Corps’s regulations include wetlands regulation, the 
difference being how wetlands are defined.  Recognizing this, 
Jackson and Nitze do not argue that the Riverside Bayview Court was 
wrong per se—they simply argue that it was wrong for the Court to 
“cryptically [conclude] that [the 1977 regulation] could serve as a 
regulatory springboard for further expansions in regulatory 
authority over adjacent wetlands [such as in Pozsgai and 
Hoffman].”133 
b. Arguments in Support of Pozsgai and Hoffman 
The Jackson and Nitze article is a wonderful illustration of the 
position of those in the judiciary who would seek to limit the 
Corps’s jurisdiction at something less than the full power of the 
Commerce Clause; it is also an illustrative contrast to the position 
asserted in this Article.  The principal difference is the focus on 
                                                          
 130. See supra Part III.A. 
 131. See Jackson & Nitze, supra note 127, at 36–38.  Arguing that the 1977 
regulations are not supported by Congress also impliedly argues that Pozsgai and 
Hoffman were wrongly decided. 
 132. See id. at 34–38 (discussing various congressional proposals in 1977 that 
would have contracted or expanded the Corps’s jurisdiction, resulting in a 
compromise scheme that the authors contend accepted the 1975 post-Callaway 
interpretation, although not specifically so stating).  They remarked that 
[t]he [Riverside Bayview Court] reviewed much of this legislative 
history . . . when it recognized that “Congress in 1977 acquiesced in the 
Corps’s definition of waters as including adjacent wetlands. . . .”  In doing 
so, the Supreme Court appears to have misapplied the 1977 legislative 
history.  A better reading of this history is that Congress intended to ratify 
the Corps’s 1975 regulations and not the 1977 regulations. 
Id. at 37–38. 
 133. Id. at 38. 
27
Fortin: Comment: Rapanos v. United States—A Historical Perspective on the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:07:02 PM 
1252 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
congressional intent; both Riverside Bayview and Jackson and Nitze 
are interpreting the same legislative history, and both come to 
plausible, though opposite conclusions.  As discussed, legislative 
history can often be molded to fit a wide variety of contrary 
conclusions.  But as this Article has endeavored to show, in the area 
of environmental regulation, judicial decisions have always followed 
a broad statutory interpretation; in fact, congressional intent has 
often been abandoned in favor of environmental protection.134  
Therefore, a focus on congressional intent can lead to an arguably 
erroneous conclusion.  The analyses of all of the waters/wetlands 
cases up to this point have involved public policy arguments; 
therefore, proper case analysis involves an application of this liberal 
precedent to the facts at hand.  With this in mind, the most logical 
conclusion is that Pozsgai and Hoffman were correctly decided 
because of the damage that could result if the federal government 
did not have the ability to regulate such wetlands, and because they 
represent a continuation in the long-standing trend or precedent 
of liberal environmental jurisprudence. 
Most courts post-Riverside Bayview agreed with this position.  
There were also calls for even further expansion of federal 
jurisdiction over wetlands.135  An article by Dennis J. Priolo argued 
that after the 1977 amendments, the Corps possessed the power to 
regulate isolated wetlands that exhibit site-specific impacts (i.e., no 
hydrologic connection) on interstate commerce.136  The Hoffman 
line of cases,137 at least with respect to migratory birds, did seem to 
lend credence to this argument.  Furthermore, Priolo argued that 
the “cumulative effect” doctrine138 as applied in Pozsgai gave the 
Corps power to regulate all isolated wetlands, regardless of whether 
                                                          
 134. That is not to say that congressional intent arguments should be 
completely abandoned; rather, they should be made in light of the purpose and 
history of waters/wetlands legislation and jurisprudence. 
 135. See generally Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for 
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 91 
(1995). 
 136. See id. at 96–100.  The author uses Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 
354 (9th Cir. 1990), in addition to Hoffman, to support this proposition.  Leslie Salt 
was also a case involving migratory birds.  “The Commerce Clause power, and thus 
the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extent the Corps’s jurisdiction to local 
water which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”  
Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360. 
 137. E.g., Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 354; United States v. Suarez, 846 F. Supp. 892 
(D. Guam 1994); Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
796 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 138. See supra note 116. 
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their impact was only site-specific.139  Priolo’s argument,140 in line 
with the thesis of this Article, is supported by judicial precedent 
that has always interpreted water pollution legislation more broadly 
than a straightforward reading of the statute might allow.  The 
RHA was extended by judicial interpretation to forbid many 
activities that had nothing to do with refuse nor anything to do with 
traditional maritime navigation, and these decisions serve as a 
foundation for an argument to extend the reaches of the Corps’s 
jurisdiction under the CWA to isolated wetlands. 
V. THE SUDDEN HALT IN JUDICIAL PIONEERING 
Tracing the decisions back through history, cases such as 
Standard Oil and Republic Steel demonstrate a judicial effort to 
expand the power of the RHA through a robust interpretation of 
the act.  Following these decisions, in an effort to catch up with the 
times, Congress passed the CWA.  History then seemed to repeat 
itself, whereas this time the judiciary used the CWA as a basis for its 
decisions, rather than the thoroughly outdated RHA, to increase 
federal protection over water pollution, herein related to wetlands.  
It would seem that Riverside Bayview, Pozsgai, and Hoffman were all 
steps along the way in an ever increasing role of the federal 
government in protecting our waters and wetlands.  So if the 
maxim that history repeats itself were to be followed again, one 
might assume that the next major development in the area of 
wetland regulation would either have been 1) a Supreme Court 
decision upholding either “site specific” or (more aggressively) 
“cumulative effect”141 regulation of isolated or semi-isolated 
                                                          
 139. See Priolo, supra note 135, at 100–08.  In addition to Pozsgai, the author 
argues that Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat quotas, although 
applied to specific farmers, in the aggregate have substantial interstate affect on 
the demand for wheat) and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) 
(loansharking as a class of activities, although in this case purely intrastate, is 
within the federal Commerce Clause power) support his proposition that any 
wetland can legally be regulated by the Corps.  Id. at 100–03.  But there is no 
discussion of the cases under the RHA that would more strongly support this 
position.  See supra Part III. 
 140. In its end, not its means.  As discussed previously, this shift in argument 
from policy to congressional intent or constitutional arguments may have led to 
the judiciary’s change in course in recent years.  Using environmental policy 
arguments based on history and precedent provides a stronger argument in 
support of broadly interpreting statutes and regulations, with sufficient deference 
to the Corps’s determinations as experts in the field. 
 141. In addition to migratory birds, various theories might have been used as a 
legal basis for upholding a “cumulative effect” ruling on isolated wetlands: for 
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wetlands under the Commerce Clause, or 2) comprehensive 
congressional legislation amending the CWA to catch-up with the 
current state of judicial precedent and interpretation.  Although 
Congress at times did pass, or attempted to pass, various legislation 
aimed at amending the CWA, none of it was very significant, at least 
with respect to the way that the CWA made obsolete the RHA.142  
Thus, it seemed that Congress was not yet prepared to act, and the 
role of expanding wetland jurisdiction would again fall to the 
Supreme Court, at least in the short term.  In 2001, the Court was 
presented with an excellent opportunity to do just that; instead, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 majority, broke ranks with 
over 100 years of legal precedent in a decision that left many 
wetlands practitioners scratching their heads. 
A. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers 
1. Factual Background 
The case of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers143 (SWANCC) arose out of northern 
Illinois in the late 1990s.  SWANCC was a municipal corporation 
that owned 533 acres of a former gravel-mining pit, which it 
intended to convert into a repository for non-hazardous waste that 
could not be otherwise disposed of or recycled.144  To convert the 
land into its intended purpose, SWANCC had to fill in a large 
section of it.145  Because approximately 17.6 acres of the parcel 
contained large surface depressions that held rainwater and other 
precipitation, SWANCC initially asked the Corps to determine 
whether its property contained any apparent wetlands.146  Although 
                                                                                                                                  
example, effects on the water table (the underground water level that mixes and 
migrates after rainfall) that may affect regional water quality.  Using arguments 
based on concrete, hydrological physics, rather than the particular fancy of a 
species of birds, adds credibility to the Commerce Clause argument in support of 
broad Corps jurisdiction, continuing the liberal trend, and it makes more difficult 
for critics to attack the argument as tangential. 
 142. See GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 11–14 (discussing various reform 
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 143. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 144. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 998 F. Supp. 946, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 145. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 191 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 146. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 948. 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/2
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:07:02 PM 
2007] RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES 1255 
the Corps initially determined it did not have jurisdiction, an 
inquiry from the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission147 led the 
Corps to reevaluate the site and require SWANCC to apply for a 
section 404 permit.148  Specifically, it was inquired whether the 
SWANCC property might be subject to federal jurisdiction because 
four different species of migratory birds had been observed there 
in the past.  The Corps eventually denied SWANCC’s two permit 
applications,149 and litigation ensued.150 
2. Opinion per Chief Justice Rehnquist 
Because the two lower court opinions151 used almost identical 
                                                          
 147. For further information on this agency, see Illinois Nature Preserves 
Commission Homepage, http://dnr.state.il.us/INPC/index.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2007). 
 148. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 948–49.  The migratory bird presence is in 
reference to 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(a)(3)(i) (1987): 
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including 
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie 
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, 
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign 
commerce including any such waters [that] are or could be used by 
interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes . . . . 
The Corps interpreted this section as “including the following waters: [those 
w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird 
Treaties . . . or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state 
lines . . . .”  51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
 149. The Supreme Court’s opinion in SWANCC elaborates on this denial: 
Despite SWANCC’s securing the required water quality certification from 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused to issue 
a [section] 404(a) permit.  The Corps found that SWANCC had not 
established that its proposal was the least environmentally damaging, 
most predictable alternative for disposal of nonhazardous solid waste; 
that SWANCC’s failure to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks 
posed an unacceptable risk to the public’s drinking water supply; and 
that the impact of the project upon area-sensitive species was 
unmitigatable since a landfill surface cannot be redeveloped into a 
forested habitat. 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 165 (2001). 
 150. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 949.  The Corps, after conducting an on-site 
survey, found several species of avian and waterfowl and various species of flora 
and avifauna.  Id. at 953.  The district court opinion contained the most objective 
and factual description of the land in question; but on appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
described the land as “an attractive woodland vegetated by approximately 170 
different species of plants,” SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848, while the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion described the land as “an abandoned sand and gravel pit,” 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.  From these descriptions alone, one need not strain 
oneself much to figure out for which party each appellate court ruled. 
 151. See SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 845; SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 946. 
31
Fortin: Comment: Rapanos v. United States—A Historical Perspective on the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:07:02 PM 
1256 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
reasoning to reach the same conclusion—that the Corps had 
jurisdiction over SWANCC land pursuant to the Migratory Bird 
Rule—and because only a 2-1 majority of a Fourth Circuit panel felt 
otherwise,152 it seemed reasonable to assume, when the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in 2000, that the vast majority of circuit 
precedent would be upheld.  Such was not the case. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Court’s opinion by 
recognizing that in Riverside Bayview, the Court had noted that the 
term “navigable waters” was of limited import and that Congress 
had intended, in passing the CWA, to regulate some waters that 
would not be held navigable in The Daniel Ball sense of the term.153  
But the Court observed that 
[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 
“navigable waters” that informed our reading of the CWA 
in [Riverside Bayview] . . . .  In order to rule for the 
respondents here, we would have to hold that the 
jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not 
adjacent to open water.154 
Second, the Court addressed the congressional “acquiescence” 
to the 1977 regulations by remarking that recognizing such 
acquiescence should be done with extreme care, and that “failed 
legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which 
to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”155  The Court made 
clear that congressional intent is not something to be merely 
assumed, stating that “[t]he relationship between the actions and 
inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of the 92d Congress 
                                                          
 152. See supra note 126. 
 153. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.  This statement was based on the “unequivocal” 
congressional acquiescence to the Corps’s regulations “interpreting the CWA to 
cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).  Notice that 
the Court is careful to point out what it had held that Congress acquiesced to—
only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.  This is a far cry from what the various 
circuits had been saying in the previous decade, that the congressional intent was 
to extend the jurisdiction of the Corps to the full extent of the Commerce Clause power.  
Cf. argument made by Jackson & Nitze, supra Part IV.C.3.a. 
 154. 531 U.S. at 167–68.  The Court’s language here makes it seem like this 
statement is shocking or unusual.  Whereas in reality, courts had been upholding 
such regulation for almost ten years. 
 155. Id. at 169–70.  In a curious and confusing passage of dicta, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist commented that the Corps had put forward no persuasive evidence that 
the original 1972 interpretation was out of line the congressional intent, despite the 
Callaway decision and the Court’s own holding in Riverside Bayview.  As to the 
import of 1972 Conference Report statement that the conferees “intend that the 
term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation,” the Chief Justice tersely rebutted its significance.  Id. at 168, n.3. 
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in passing [section] 404(a) is . . . considerably attenuated.”156  The 
Court thus concluded that the Corps had failed to make the 
necessary showing that Congress had acquiesced to the Migratory 
Bird Rule, a rule that had been promulgated almost a decade 
earlier with no adverse congressional reaction of which to speak.157 
Lastly, the Court held that this was not a case where Chevron 
deference would be appropriate, as it was in Riverside Bayview.158  
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a clear indication from 
Congress would be required in order to uphold an administrative 
interpretation of a statute that invokes the outer limits of 
constitutional power.159  The Court concluded its opinion by ruling 
that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeds congressional authority 
granted to the Corps, reversing the Seventh Circuit, and effectively 
overruling the Hoffman line of cases.160 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 170.  “[S]ubsequent history is less illuminating than the 
contemporaneous evidence . . . .  [R]espondents face a difficult task in 
overcoming the plain text and import of [Section] 404(a).”  Id.  The Court here is 
correctly giving little weight to legislative history, but incorrectly focuses on 
lexicography.  It should have looked to the history and precedent under the RHA, 
and should have relied more heavily on the post-CWA trend started by Riverside 
Bayview. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 172. 
 159. Id.  This concept is rooted in the long standing Supreme Court canon of 
statutory construction that the Court should not “needlessly reach constitutional 
issues . . . where [an] administrative interpretation alters the federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon traditional state power.”  Id. 
at 172–73. 
 160. Id. at 174.  This holding was by no means unanimous.  Justice Stevens, 
writing for a four-Justice minority, fervently denounced the Court’s majority 
opinion as contrary to the current state of the law.  See id. at 174–97 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  The minority essentially echoed the sentiments of the district court 
and the Seventh Circuit, discussed above, adding a comprehensive discussion of 
CWA legislative history to support the proposition that the “‘major purpose’ of the 
CWA was ‘to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water 
pollution’” and that the goals of the CWA “have nothing to do with navigation at 
all.”  Id. at 179, 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
  Although the majority did not reach the Commerce Clause question, the 
dissent would have upheld the rule under the broader cumulative effect doctrine, 
thereby extending the holding in Pozsgai.  See id. at 192–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
See also discussion of Pozsgai, supra Part IV.C.1.  Justice Stevens’s opinion did an 
excellent job looking past semantics and ambiguous congressional intent, focusing 
on the purposes and policies that have driven forward all waters/wetlands 
legislation and judicial decisions in the past.  He echoed these same opinions, 
though in a slightly different context, in his dissenting opinion in Rapanos.  See 
infra Part V.C.3.c. 
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3. Analysis 
Even though the majority opinion in SWANCC makes it very 
clear that the Migratory Bird Rule is not a permissible 
interpretation of the CWA, it does very little else to shed light on 
what are the limits of the Corps’s jurisdiction.  In the past, many 
Supreme Court decisions have set forth a test or guidelines of some 
sort that would allow courts in the future to make appropriate 
rulings in that particular area of law.  SWANCC does not even 
attempt to do this.  The lack of guidance in SWANCC may be due to 
the fact that wetlands law originates primarily from the CWA and a 
common-law test might therefore be inappropriate.  Support for 
this argument is found in various parts of the opinion, which 
almost seemed to beg Congress for an answer or clarification on 
what its true intent was in 1972, and more importantly in 1977.  But 
this approach is markedly different from past rulings.  As this 
Article has attempted to show, the Supreme Court, and the federal 
court system in general, have largely taken the initiative by pushing 
Congress to act on more comprehensive environmental legislation 
through their broad interpretations of both RHA and CWA. 
For whatever reason, the SWANCC Court was uncomfortable 
with this precedent of over 100 years, and decided to take the 
opposite approach—giving the CWA a “miserly construction”161 in a 
possible attempt to urge Congress to act.  Such a narrow 
construction might force Congress to state that it did in fact intend 
for the CWA to reach the full extent of the Commerce Clause, or 
whatever variation short thereof that it desired, by enacting new 
legislation. 
So, after 100 years of activism, did the Court truly wish to make 
further rulings in a minimalistic fashion, or was the Court simply 
expressing a “one-time” dissatisfaction with a rule that it found 
particularly offensive?  Or, perhaps, the Migratory Bird Rule 
pushed federal wetlands regulation too far, too fast?  After all, the 
RHA had been around for almost seventy years when the rulings in 
Standard Oil and Republic Steel were handed down, whereas the 
Migratory Bird Rule appeared after barely fifteen years of the 
CWA’s existence.  Yet another potential motivator might have been 
that the problem of environmental pollution is no longer as dire as 
it was in the 1960s (many would argue with this point, but it must 
be conceded that, for example, the Cuyahoga River no longer 
                                                          
 161. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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possesses the same flammable qualities that it did in 1969).162 
B. The Aftermath of SWANCC 
Soon after the SWANCC decision was published, these same 
questions began to plague the federal courts.  The issue in 
Pozsgai—whether wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable water 
were within the Corps’s jurisdiction—suddenly became litigable 
once again.  As these new tributary cases began to pop up across 
the country, the circuits were given an opportunity to add their 
own gloss to SWANCC; that is, whether they felt that decision truly 
represented a shift away from judicial activism in wetlands 
regulation.   
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District is a typical post-
SWANCC tributary case that represents the majority sentiment 
among the circuits.163  The case involved a question of jurisdiction 
over lands parallel and adjacent to irrigation canals, which 
eventually connected to traditionally navigable waters.164  The court 
read the opinion in SWANCC as limited to “intrastate waters with 
no connection to any navigable waters, but which were or would be 
used as habitat by migratory birds,” contrasting the irrigation canals 
by describing them as “not ‘isolated waters’ such as those that the 
[Supreme Court] concluded were outside the jurisdiction of the 
Clean Water Act.”165  The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, appears to be 
the only circuit that took the opposite approach.  In re Needham was 
an oil spill case where the tributary in question was a drainage ditch 
in southern Louisiana that eventually emptied into the Gulf of 
Mexico.166  In concluding that these waters were not subject to 
federal regulation as navigable waters, the court expressed a 
sentiment similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in SWANCC: 
“[T]he regulatory definition, if applied in this fashion, would push 
the [jurisdictional bounds] to the outer limits of the Commerce 
Clause and raise serious constitutional questions.”167  Thus, the 
circuit courts of appeal were unable to reach a post-SWANCC 
consensus on the question of whether tributaries of navigable 
                                                          
 162. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 163. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 164. Id. at 533. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 354 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 167. Id. at 345 n.8.  As in SWANCC, the Fifth Circuit here declined to extend 
Chevron deference to the regulation.  Id. 
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waters were also themselves navigable waters, hence subjecting any 
adjacent wetlands to CWA regulation.168 
Despite all of the possible implications of SWANCC and its 
effects on the Corps’s jurisdiction, the Corps itself did not seem to 
think much of the decision.  In fact, the Corps read SWANCC very 
narrowly, and reaffirmed its commitment to its “no net loss of 
wetlands” policy.169  The Corps also announced new regulations for 
its field staff to follow when assessing CWA issues, the only changes 
being that they could no longer use the Migratory Bird Rule, and 
that they should seek permission from headquarters before 
pursuing action against other non-navigable intrastate waters.170  
Based on these facts it does not seem that the Corps felt that 
section 328.3(a) was affected at all; the Corps merely treated its 
Migratory Bird Rule interpretation of that section as void and did 
                                                          
 168. Judge Snyder in United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 
1180, 1183–84 (C.D. Cal. 2004), notes a significant circuit split in decisions 
applying SWANCC.  Although no true consensus was reached, most cases seemed 
to correctly interpret past waters/wetlands precedent and decided to construe 
SWANCC narrowly.  E.g., United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(construing SWANCC narrowly; cranberry bogs adjacent to tributaries were subject 
to the Corps’s jurisdiction); Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (construing SWANCC narrowly; Corps’s 
jurisdiction did not depend on existence of actual hydrological or ecological 
connection); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(construing SWANCC narrowly; consent decree concerning wetlands adjacent to 
tributaries not affected).  It is important to note that, had SWANCC set forth some 
sort of jurisdictional test, much of this litigation would likely not have been 
necessary. 
 169. See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Administration to 
Reaffirm Commitment to No Net Loss of Wetlands and Address Approach for 
Protecting Isolated Waters in Light of Supreme Court Ruling on Jurisdictional 
Issues (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/      
newsreleases .htm (follow “By Date: 2003” hyperlink; then follow “Earlier Releases” 
hyperlink repeatedly until reaching “01/10/2003”; then follow hyperlink to the 
release) (announcing actions that “reaffirm federal authority over the vast majority 
of America’s wetlands”). 
 170. The Corps gave the following instructions to its field staff: 
Field staff should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional 
navigable waters (and adjacent wetlands) and, generally speaking, their 
tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands).  In light of SWANCC, field staff 
should not assert CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters that are both 
intrastate and non-navigable, where the sole basis available for asserting 
CWA jurisdiction rests on any of the factors listed in the “Migratory Bird 
Rule.”  In light of SWANCC, field staff should seek formal project-specific 
HQ approval prior to asserting jurisdiction over isolated non-navigable 
intrastate waters based on other types of interstate commerce links listed 
in current regulatory definitions of “waters of the U.S.” 
Id. 
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not make any formal amendment to its regulations.171 
The Corps’s reaction to the SWANCC decision is 
understandable in light of the fact that it had always, up until 2001, 
largely enjoyed the support and backing of the judiciary to make its 
own decisions and interpretations.  The Corps likely felt that 
SWANCC was something of an anomaly, and that further judgments 
would vindicate its right to assert broad jurisdiction over wetlands.  
After all, the Corps had been directly in charge of water/wetlands 
since the RHA was first passed, and it therefore had a better 
perspective than any other branch of government to see that the 
judiciary had always been pioneering and held more regard for 
environmental concerns than for congressional intent.  It is likely 
that the Corps was unsure how to proceed after the SWANCC 
opinion and felt that it was best to “wait and see” what the courts 
would do next.  In fact, most of the reported decisions after 
SWANCC appear to be (arguably) correctly decided.  Most decisions 
followed the spirit of the previous hundred years of precedent and 
either distinguished SWANCC or limited it to its facts.  Decisions 
like Needham appear to be limited to the Fifth Circuit.  Although 
these circuit decisions post-SWANCC did provide some degree of 
guidance, the Corps did not have to wait long for the Supreme 
Court to again weigh in on the issue. 
C. Rapanos v. United States 
1. Factual Background 
Rapanos v. United States172 came before the Supreme Court as a 
consolidation of two separate Sixth Circuit cases with nearly 
identical facts: Rapanos v. United States173 and Carabell v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers.174 
a. Rapanos 
In the first case, Rapanos was a land developer in Bay, 
                                                          
 171. The Corps only paid lip service to the Supreme Court’s decision, stating 
that “[w]e are committed to protecting America’s wetlands and watersheds to the 
full extent under the Clean Water Act and the recent Supreme Court ruling.  We 
are also committed to full public involvement in this process, and we will seek 
additional information and scientific data for possible rulemaking.”  Id.  But this 
rulemaking never occurred. 
 172. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
 173. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 174. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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Midland, and Saginaw Counties in Michigan.175  In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, he began to fill in parts of his lands in preparation 
for construction, despite the advice of the state and an 
independent consultant, who had noted the presence of a 
significant number of acres of wetlands on the properties.176  After 
the Corps discovered that Rapanos had been filling wetlands in 
violation of the CWA, and after Rapanos ignored various orders 
from the Corps to cease and desist, over a decade of criminal and 
civil litigation ensued.177 
b. Carabell 
In the second case, the Carabells were land developers who 
owned approximately twenty acres in Chesterfield Township, 
Macomb County, Michigan, near Lake Saint Clair,178 which they 
sought to fill and develop into a condominium complex.179  In 
2000, the Carabells applied to the Corps for, and were denied, a 
section 404 permit to add over 50,000 cubic yards of fill material to 
their land.180  The Corps reasoned that “the operation and use of 
the proposed activity would have major, long term, negative 
impacts on water quality, on terrestrial wildlife, on the wetlands, on 
conservation, and on the overall ecology of the area.”181  The 
Carabells eventually brought suit arguing that “the Corps lacked 
regulatory jurisdiction over the property because [it was] isolated 
from all outside waters.”182  Geographically speaking, the Rapanos 
and Carabell wetlands were all adjacent to tributaries of traditional 
navigable waters; hence, they were not directly adjacent to 
traditionally navigable waters, as in Riverside Bayview, but they also 
were not so isolated as to have no direct hydrological connection at 
all to navigable waters as in SWANCC.183  As discussed above, it was 
                                                          
 175. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632–33. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 633–34. 
 178. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705.  Recall that the wetlands in question in Riverside 
Bayview were located a similar distance from Lake St. Clair.  The difference in 
disposition is due to the fact that Riverside Bayview, unlike Carabell, involved a 
portion of wetlands that directly abutted a navigable-in-fact creek.  Rapanos, 126   
S. Ct. at 2240 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 179. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705. 
 180. Id. at 706. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 707. 
 183. In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals described the land as 
follows: 
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these types of wetlands that had caused the post-SWANCC rift 
between the Fifth Circuit and the rest of the courts of appeals. 
2. On Appeal at the Sixth Circuit 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the right of the Corps to 
exercise jurisdiction in each case, distinguishing SWANCC on its 
facts.  The Carabell court concluded on the authority of section 
328.3(a) that, as a factual matter, the wetlands in question were 
adjacent to waters of the United States.184  The Rapanos court 
reached a similar conclusion and recognized that in light of 
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, what constitutes an adjacent 
wetland is still debatable.185  Although both courts recognized that 
the holding in SWANCC had removed from federal jurisdiction 
some isolated wetlands, they chose to follow the majority of courts 
in reading SWANCC narrowly—as excising only the Migratory Bird 
Rule.186  Furthermore, both courts found that SWANCC did not 
alter Riverside Bayview, and that the Riverside Bayview nexus 
extended not only to wetlands directly adjacent to navigable waters, 
but also to wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters.187  
The Rapanos court also commented that Congress clearly 
envisioned that CWA jurisdiction would extend to wetlands with a 
                                                                                                                                  
[T]he Salzburg wetlands have a surface water connection to tributaries of 
the Kawkawlin River, which in turn, flows into the Saginaw River and 
ultimately into Lake Huron. . . . [T]he Hines Road site [has] a surface 
water connection to the Rose Drain which, in turn, has a surface water 
connection to the Tittabawassee River. . . . [T]he Pine River site [has] a 
surface water connection to the Pine River, which flows into Lake Huron. 
376 F.3d at 642–43.  In Carabell, the Sixth Circuit described the land by noting: 
[There is a] berm edging the Carabells’ property [that] serves to block 
immediate drainage of surface water out of the parcel into [a] ditch. . . . 
At the northeastern corner of the property, the ditch connects to the 
Sutherland-Oemig Drain, which empties into the Auvase Creek, which 
empties into Lake St. Clair, which is part of the Great Lakes drainage 
system. 
391 F.3d at 705. 
 184. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 708–09. 
 185. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 635, 642. 
 186. See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709 (declining to follow the Needham minority, 
which gave SWANCC a broader reading); Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 638–39 (citing 
various circuit precedent post-SWANCC giving that decision a narrow reading). 
 187. See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709–10 (noting congressional acquiescence to 
regulation of adjacent wetlands); Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 639–40, 642 (affirming the 
need for a hydrological connection, while refuting the “direct abutment” 
requirement). 
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hydrological connection to navigable waters.188 
3. At the Supreme Court 
Although a majority of five Justices voted to vacate the 
opinions of the Sixth Circuit and remand the matters back to the 
district court for further findings, the United States Supreme Court 
was unable to agree on a definite standard or test for how to 
reevaluate the two cases, or future cases that involve wetlands 
adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters.  Four 
Justices would have limited the CWA to relatively permanent bodies 
of water or wetlands whose surface area is wholly contiguous with 
traditional waters of the United States,189 one Justice would have 
used the “significant nexus” test—introduced by the SWANCC court 
to describe the holding in Riverside Bayview—to analyze wetlands on 
a case-by-case basis,190 and the other four Justices would have 
upheld the right of the Corps to determine and follow their own 
reasonable regulations, so long as they did not reach truly isolated 
waters as in SWANCC.191 
a. Justice Scalia’s Opinion 
i. Rejecting the Corps’s Regulations 
The plurality opinion began by criticizing the Corps for not 
changing their regulations after SWANCC, and further chastising 
the federal judiciary for the wholesale acceptance of the Corps’s 
broad interpretations of their jurisdiction.192  Second, it entered 
                                                          
 188. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 640.  This court also cited Chevron deference as an 
alternate ground for upholding the Corps’s jurisdiction.  Id. at 640–41. 
 189. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214–35 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
plurality opinion, with whom Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito 
joined). 
 190. See id. at 2236–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also supra note 154 and 
accompanying quotation from SWANCC. 
 191. See id. at 2252–65 (Stevens, J., dissenting, with whom Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Souter joined). 
 192. See id. at 2217–19 (plurality opinion).  Although SWANCC provided 
almost no guidance, and it did not set forth any sort of rule to be followed, Justice 
Scalia nonetheless remarked: 
Following our decision in SWANCC, the Corps did not significantly revise 
its theory of federal jurisdiction under [section 404 of the CWA].  The 
Corps provided notice of a proposed rulemaking in light of SWANCC, but 
ultimately did not amend its published regulations. . . .  Even after 
SWANCC, the lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps’s 
sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains 
40
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into an extended discussion of what constitutes waters of the 
United States, first recognizing the holding in Riverside Bayview that 
the meaning of navigable waters is broader than the traditional 
understanding, although not devoid of significance.193  Justice 
Scalia argued that the Corps’s expansive interpretation of navigable 
waters cannot be upheld because: (1) the dictionary definition of 
waters does not support the conclusion,194 (2) the plain language of 
the statute does not support the conclusion,195 (3) the term 
navigable waters carries some of its original significance,196 (4) the 
CWA uses an alternate term, “point source,” to include the 
geographical features that the Corps would erroneously include 
within navigable waters,197 (5) the limited definition of waters of the 
                                                                                                                                  
as tributaries. . . .  These judicial constructions of “tributaries” are not 
outliers.  Rather, they reflect the breadth of the Corps’s determinations 
in the field. 
Id. at 2217–18 (citation omitted).  Justice Scalia particularly focused on the fact 
that “adjacency” had taken on an over-extended meaning.  See id. at 2218–19 
(citing and criticizing much of the post-SWANCC precedent). 
 193. Id. at 2220. 
 194. Although Justice Scalia was able to use the dictionary for an argument in 
his favor (reproduced in part in this note), Justice Kennedy used the same 
dictionary to support his opinion. See id. at 2242–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
The Corps’s expansive approach might be arguable if the CWA defined 
“navigable waters” as “water of the United States.”  But “the waters of the 
United States” is something else.  The use of the definite article (“the”) 
and the plural number (“waters”) show plainly that [the CWA definition] 
does not refer to water in general.  In this form, “the waters” refers more 
narrowly to water “[a]s found in streams and bodies forming 
geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” or “the flowing 
or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or 
bodies.” 
Id. at 2220–21 (quoting from WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d 
ed. 1954)). 
 195. “[T]he Corps has stretched the term ‘waters of the United States’ beyond 
parody.  The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this ‘Land is 
Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 2222.  This statement seems 
contrary to the Court’s opinion in Standard Oil and Republic Steel.  See supra Part 
III.C. 
 196. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (comparing the meaning as used in the 
Daniel Ball, Riverside Bayview, and SWANCC). 
 197. This is the first time any court had suggested that wetlands regulation was 
a wholly separate subject from waters regulation in general; most courts have read 
these sections in pari materia without hesitation, as there is nothing (besides this 
opinion) to suggest that they were meant to be separate regulatory spheres.  In 
fact, many of the same statutory definitions apply to both sections.  Nonetheless, 
the plurality argued that: 
Most significant of all, the CWA itself categorizes the channels and 
conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from 
“navigable waters,” by including them in the definition of “‘point 
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United States is consistent with federalism and states’ rights,198 and 
(6) the Supreme Court canons of construction require a “‘clear 
and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an 
unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority” or “an 
agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of 
constitutional validity.”199  Rather, Justice Scalia argued that the 
proper interpretation of “waters of the United States” is “only those 
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of 
water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary 
parlance as streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, and lakes.”200 
ii. Issues of Adjacency 
The plurality then discussed its discontent with the growing 
body of federal precedent that wetlands may be considered 
adjacent to navigable waters because of a remote hydrologic 
connection.201  They argued that Riverside Bayview only recognized 
wetlands as waters to a limited extent, allowing agency deference in 
                                                                                                                                  
source.’” . . .  The definitions thus conceive of “point sources” and 
“navigable waters” as separate and distinct categories. . . .  The separate 
classification of “ditch[es], channel[s], and conduit[s]”—which are terms 
ordinarily used to describe the watercourses through which intermittent 
waters typically flow—shows that these are, by and large, not “waters of 
the United States.” 
Id. at 2222–23. 
 198. Ignoring the pre-CWA history that the states were simply unable or 
unwilling to regulate water pollution under the 1948 FWPCA, the plurality 
commented that: 
[T]he foregoing definition of “waters” is consistent with the CWA’s stated 
“policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .” 
[Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)].  But the 
expansive theory advanced by the Corps, rather than “preserv[ing] the 
primary rights and responsibilities of the States,” would have brought 
virtually all “plan[ning of] the development and use . . . of land and 
water resources” by the States under federal control.  It is therefore an 
unlikely reading of the phrase “the waters of the United States.” 
Id. at 2223–24. 
 199. See id. at 2224 (“Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the 
development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a 
quintessential state and local power, . . . [and] the Corps’s interpretation stretches 
the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power . . . .”). 
 200. Id. at 2225. 
 201. See id. at 2225–27 (noting, however, the “inherent ambiguity in drawing 
the boundaries of any ‘waters’”). 
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that case because of the difficulty in delineating boundaries.202  
They also rejected the formulation that wetlands “in reasonable 
proximity” to navigable waters or wetlands that have an “ecological 
connection” to navigable waters is sufficient to bring them within 
the jurisdiction of the CWA.203  The plurality concluded that “only 
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that 
are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right . . . [are] 
covered by the [CWA],” while those “with only an intermittent, 
physically remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the United 
States’ . . . lack the necessary connection.”204 
iii.  Refuting Environmental Concerns 
The plurality then addressed some of the concerns raised at 
oral argument that a curtailment of the Corps’s jurisdiction over 
wetlands would have ramifications across the board on all types of 
environmental pollution.205  They reasoned that the dredged/fill 
material typically used to fill wetlands is different from pollutants in 
that dredged/fill material is stationary, while other pollutants are 
mobile.206  They also asserted that the preservation of wetlands is 
                                                          
 202. See id. at 2225–26 (“[T]he [Corps] could reasonably conclude that a 
wetland that ‘adjoin[ed]’ waters of the United States is itself a part of those 
waters.”). 
 203. Id. at 2226 n.10.  Even though SWANCC can, at best, only be read as 
rejecting a single ecological consideration, the Migratory Bird Rule, the plurality 
made the sweeping assertion that “the most natural reading of [Riverside Bayview] 
is that a wetlands’ mere ‘reasonable proximity’ to waters of the United States is not 
enough to confer Corps jurisdiction.”  Id.  “[Furthermore], SWANCC rejected the 
notion that the ecological considerations . . . [provide] an independent basis for 
including entries like ‘wetlands’ (or ‘ephemeral streams’) within the phrase ‘the 
waters of the United States.’  SWANCC found such ecological considerations 
irrelevant . . . .”  Id. at 2226. 
 204. Id. at 2226. 
 205. Id. at 2227–28. 
 206. Chevron held that the judiciary is not in as good of a position as Congress 
or the Executive to make scientific decisions that require background knowledge 
or expertise—hence, deference is appropriate.  But the plurality here took it upon 
themselves to base their opinion on their own interpretation of the ecological and 
hydrological science involved: 
“[D]redged or fill material,” which is typically deposited for the sole 
purpose of staying put, does not normally wash downstream, and thus 
does not normally constitute an “addition . . . to navigable waters” when 
deposited in upstream isolated wetlands. . . . [while] the deposit of mobile 
pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels is naturally described [as 
such] . . . . 
Id. at 2228, 2228 n.11. 
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not one of the goals of the CWA.207 
iv. The Judgment of the Court 
The plurality opinion concluded by vacating the decisions of 
the Sixth Circuit and remanding for a determination whether 
“[f]irst, . . . the adjacent channel contains a ‘wate[r] of the United 
States,’” as Justice Scalia has described it; and second, whether “the 
wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, 
making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the 
‘wetland’ begins.”208 
b. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion 
i. The “Significant Nexus” Test 
Justice Kennedy began his opinion209 by identifying the 
“significant nexus” test as the basis of his argument, relying on 
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC as definitive support for the test.210 
Taken together [Riverside Bayview and SWANCC] establish 
that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, 
the connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland 
and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so 
close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a 
“navigable water” under the [CWA].  In other instances, 
as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no 
                                                          
 207. See id. at 2228 (“[A] Comprehensive National Wetlands Protection Act is 
not before us, and the ‘wis[dom]’ of such a statute . . . is beyond our ken.  What is 
clear, however, is that Congress did not enact one when it granted the Corps 
jurisdiction over only ‘the waters of the United States.’”).  What is more “clear,” 
however, is that most other courts, at least in part, have disagreed with this 
assertion. 
 208. Id. at 2227, 2235.  The only controlling aspect of the main opinion was 
that the cases should be vacated and remanded.  Justice Scalia’s determinative 
considerations on remand are no more binding than anything else in his opinion.  
It also deserves mention that Chief Justice Roberts, in a brief opinion concurring 
with the plurality, chastised the Corps in stronger terms for not having rewritten 
their regulations post-SWANCC, stating that although “[i]t is unfortunate that no 
opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress’s 
limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act, . . . [t]he upshot today is another 
defeat for the agency.”  Id. at 2235–36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 209. Although the opinion concurs in the result, the majority of the text is 
spent rejecting the arguments that Justice Scalia made. 
 210. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236, 2240–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[T]o constitute ‘navigable waters’ under the [CWA], a water or 
wetland must possess a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in 
fact or that could reasonably be so made.”). 
44
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/2
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:07:02 PM 
2007] RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES 1269 
connection.  Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under 
the [CWA] is lacking.211 
To this end, he took issue with the plurality’s description of 
wetlands in that it seemed to use a dismissive tone with respect to 
the importance of wetlands because, if wetlands did not have an 
ecological role to play with respect to traditionally navigable waters, 
there could never be a significant nexus between the two.212 
ii. Justice Kennedy’s Recommendations 
Justice Kennedy then presented the Corps with two 
alternatives: it could either (1) rewrite its regulations to specifically 
exclude such things as “drains, ditches, and streams remote from 
any navigable-in-fact water” or, (2) “[a]bsent more specific 
regulations  . . . the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a 
case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on 
adjacency to non-navigable tributaries.”213  He reasoned that his 
solution to the problem will prevent constitutional Commerce 
Clause or federalism difficulties, and that it will avoid problematic 
applications of the statute.214  Justice Kennedy concluded his 
opinion by pointing out some facts from both the Rapanos and 
Carabell cases that might be used to support a significant nexus 
finding upon remand, in addition to pieces of evidence that are 
lacking and might be further developed.215 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 2241. 
 212. See id. at 2237–38 (“Contrary to the plurality’s description . . . wetlands are 
not simply moist patches of earth.”). 
 213. Id. at 2249. 
 214. Id. at 2249–50. 
 215. The facts Justice Kennedy highlighted in Rapanos were: 
An expert . . . testified that the wetlands were providing “habitat, 
sediment trapping, nutrient recycling, and flood peak diminution” . . . .  
[T]he District Court made extensive findings regarding water tables and 
drainage on the parcels at issue. . . .  [E]stablishment of a significant 
nexus . . . [might be] supplemented by further evidence about the 
significance of the tributaries to which the wetlands are connected. 
Id. at 2250. The facts he identified from the Carabell case were: 
The Corps noted . . . “that the project would have a major, long-term 
detrimental effect on wetlands, flood retention, recreation and 
conservation and overall ecology” . . . .  The conditional language in [the 
Corps’s assessment]—“potential ability,” “possible flooding”—could 
suggest an undue degree of speculation, and a reviewing court must 
identify substantial evidence . . . .  [T]he record does show that factors 
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry have already been noted and 
considered. . . .  [T]he Corps based its jurisdiction solely on the wetlands’ 
adjacency to the ditch opposite the berm on the property’s edge, [which 
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c. Justice Stevens’ Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, would 
have sustained the authority of the Corps to continue asserting 
jurisdiction over all wetlands adjacent to tributaries in conformance 
with its regulations.  It criticized Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as 
failing to defer sufficiently to the Corps, though recognizing that 
he was far more faithful to precedent and principles of statutory 
interpretation; it dismissed Justice Scalia’s “creative” criticisms as 
disregarding the “nature of the congressional delegation to the 
agency and the technical and complex character of the issues at 
stake.”216 
i. Relying on Riverside Bayview, Dismissing SWANCC 
In the view of the dissenting Justices, the Corps’s 
determination that “wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally 
navigable waters preserve the quality of our Nation’s waters . . . 
[was] a quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statutory provision.”217  They would have relied 
wholly on Riverside Bayview because they felt that the question 
presented, and answered in the affirmative there, included such 
wetlands adjacent to tributaries as were at issue in the present 
case.218  Furthermore, the dissent did not read Riverside Bayview to 
include a surface connection requirement because that opinion’s 
mention of such a connection was made in the context of a 
statement of approval, rather than a steadfast requirement.219  The 
dissent reasoned that, as a class, the majority of wetlands have a 
                                                                                                                                  
is not a strong enough connection]. 
Id. at 2251–52. 
 216. Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissenting opinion most closely 
follows the ideas developed in this Article. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 2255 (“Although the particular wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview 
abutted a navigable creek, we framed the question presented as whether the Clean 
Water Act ‘authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the 
Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies 
of waters and their tributaries.’”).  This statement observes the broad holding in 
Riverside Bayview, and it further supports the conclusion that the Court was wrong 
to restrict the Corps’s authority in SWANCC and in the present case. 
 219. Id. at 2255–56 (“Contrary to the plurality’s revisionist reading today, . . . 
Riverside Bayview nowhere implied that our approval of ‘adjacent’ wetlands was 
contingent upon an understanding that ‘adjacent’ means having a ‘continuous 
surface connection’ between the wetland and its neighboring [navigable 
waters] . . . .”). 
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great impact on the environment, and therefore deserve to be 
protected, while the minority of less significant wetlands may simply 
be developed through the section 404 permitting process.220  They 
also placed significance on the 1977 congressional session that 
discussed, but failed to pass an amendment specifically limiting the 
Corps’s jurisdiction.221  The dissent dismissed the plurality’s 
reliance on the holding in SWANCC as not on point because it dealt 
with a question specifically reserved in Riverside Bayview, namely, 
the Corps’s jurisdiction over isolated waters.222 
ii. Refuting Economic Concerns 
The dissent then shifted its focus to general economic 
concerns that the wetlands permitting process is too time 
consuming and expensive, noting that “[t]he Corps approves 
virtually all section 404 permit[s], though often requiring 
applicants to avoid or mitigate impacts to wetlands and other 
waters.”223  It attempted to put the seemingly high cost in context by 
showing that wetland expenditures constitute “only a small fraction 
of 1% of the $760 billion spent each year on private and public 
construction and development activity.”224  The dissent also refuted 
the plurality’s charge that its opinion was “policy-laden” by showing 
that the policies expressed were Congress’s, rather than Justice 
Stevens’s.225 
iii. Judicial Deference 
Justice Stevens then expressed his view that any intervention 
that would restrict the Corps’s jurisdiction is not within the purview 
of the judiciary and should be addressed by Congress: 
Whether the benefits of particular conservation measures 
outweigh their costs is a classic question of public policy 
that should not be answered by appointed judges.  The 
fact that large investments are required to finance large 
developments merely means that those who are most 
adversely affected by the Corps’s permitting decisions are 
                                                          
 220. Id. at 2256. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 2258 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224. Id. at 2258–59 (questioning the impartiality of the plurality’s exaggerated 
concern about cost that fails to recognize the benefits that the CWA has provided). 
 225. Id. at 2259 n.8.  Justice Stevens’s opinion hits the mark by identifying 
policy as the paramount consideration. 
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persons who have the ability to communicate effectively 
with their representatives.  Unless and until they succeed 
in convincing Congress (or the Corps) that clean water is 
less important today than it was in the 1970’s [sic], we 
continue to owe deference to regulations satisfying the 
“evident breadth of congressional concern for protection 
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems . . . .”226 
4. Deciphering the Holding 
To many, the Rapanos decision was even more confusing than 
the SWANCC decision.227  Observers questioned whether 
landowners might have an easier time getting a permit from the 
Corps, or whether only the existing nomenclature would change.228  
In 1977, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on how to handle a 
plurality decision.229  The rule states that when a majority of the 
Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on 
the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the 
narrowest ground to which a majority of the justices would have 
assented if forced to choose.230  Therefore, in considering what it 
would take to achieve a majority of five Justices, courts have to 
determine where the “middle ground” is.  Clearly, this is Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, because it rejects the plurality’s narrow 
interpretation while using the “significant nexus” test to somewhat 
restrict the dissent’s broad interpretation.  Therefore, any decision 
that uses Justice Kennedy’s test to uphold jurisdiction would not 
gain the support of the four plurality Justices, but would likely gain 
the support of the four dissenting Justices because it is the “next 
best option” if they were forced to choose; hence, there would be a 
five-Justice majority.  If jurisdiction were rejected, the inverse would 
be true.231 
Since June 2006, there have been a handful of decisions that 
discuss Rapanos; all but one of them have reached the conclusion 
that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test will be controlling 
                                                          
 226. Id. at 2259. 
 227. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Lawyers, Developers Puzzle over Wetlands Case,    
5 NO. 25 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 3 (June 23, 2006) (“There’s a developing consensus that 
things are probably more confusing now than before the opinion was issued. . . .”). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 230. Id. at 193. 
 231. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 
2006), for a detailed description of the deductive reasoning required under Marks 
to reach the conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is controlling. 
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from now on.232  Whether the trend continues is anyone’s guess, 
and until there is a larger body of post-Rapanos precedent, lawyers 
and developers will have to feel their way through these 
jurisprudential uncertainties on a case-by-case basis.  It is important 
to keep in mind, though, that in the context of the 100 years or 
more of precedent in waters/wetlands law, Rapanos is “just a turn in 
a long and winding road.”233 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Tracing the steps back through history, the progressive and 
“pioneering” trend in waters/wetlands jurisprudence should now 
be clear.  First, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of 
navigable waters to include waters that are purely intrastate when 
they have linked effects on interstate commerce.  Second, over the 
course of seventy years, the federal courts gradually expanded and 
stretched, with little regard to congressional intent, the 
interpretation of the RHA from a purely navigational statute to a 
comprehensive water pollution prevention tool, culminating in two 
                                                          
 232. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(discharging fill material into a cranberry bog without a permit—the court held 
that the jurisdictional test was either Justice Kennedy’s test or the plurality’s 
guidelines); Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25 (concluding that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion controls because in most cases it will command a “forced” 
majority of the court, regardless of whether he finds for or against jurisdiction, 
and remanding for further findings by the district court); N. Cal. River Watch v. 
City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (controlling opinion is that of 
Justice Kennedy, seepage between a pond and a river, separated by a man-made 
levy, is enough to find a nexus); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., No.      
C 01-2821 MHP, 2007 WL 43654, at *12–15 (N.D. Cal. Jan 8, 2007) (following the 
significant nexus test, rejecting Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion); United States v. 
Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 
2006) (recognizing that either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test may be used 
and upholding CWA jurisdiction related to a search warrant for water pollution).  
But see United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. 
Tex. 2006) (reasoning that because Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test was 
too uncertain to follow, the court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent (Needham, 
supra Part V.B) and construed the holding in Rapanos narrowly, rejecting Corps 
jurisdiction). 
  Since the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits seem to have no 
difficulty interpreting Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the decision of this district court 
seems unusual, and it may be reversed or vacated—unless, of course, the Fifth 
Circuit decides to continue its unusual tradition of construing federal wetlands 
jurisdiction narrowly, which would be unfortunate because Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi have many of the most fragile and endangered inland and coastal 
wetlands in the country. 
 233. Tebo, supra note 227. 
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Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s that almost completely 
abandoned the language of the statute.  Third, Congress belatedly 
reacted in 1972 to pass the first effective, enforceable, national 
water pollution legislation, which came to be known as the CWA, in 
response to the judiciary’s repeated prodding for such legislation.  
The Corps then promulgated its own regulations under the new 
law, which became increasingly broad throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, and Congress never acted to invalidate these laws.  Fourth, 
the Supreme Court affirmed what had become a pattern of liberal 
and broad interpretations up to that point (1985) under the CWA 
and further invited the judiciary to test the bounds of the CWA 
both in the language of the statute itself and under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.  And fifth, the federal courts continued their 
trend of expanding the Corps’s jurisdiction over the following 
fifteen years, upholding such novel concepts as tributary wetland 
regulation and migratory-bird-based wetland regulation. 
With all of this history and precedent, the proper ruling 
should have been clear to the Court in 2001 when deciding 
SWANCC and in 2006 when deciding Rapanos.  Instead, the Court 
in both of these cases made assertions that were arguably contrary 
to the state of the law.  In SWANCC, these include first, the 
introduction of the nebulous “significant nexus,” which is a poor 
proxy for the environmental policy arguments that should inform 
judges’ decisions.  Second, the Court asserted that the Corps had 
not made a sufficient showing that Congress had accepted its 
regulations even though Congress had never acted to contravene 
the Corps’s determinations in the over ten years that the 
regulations had been enforced.  And third, the Court refused to 
give Chevron deference to the Corps’s determinations, implying that 
the regulations were not a reasonable interpretation of the CWA 
even though they were consistent with the ever increasing 
regulatory power that the Corps had enjoyed and had come to 
depend on. 
In Rapanos, the plurality’s position was arguably even more 
contrary to the state of the law, but fortunately because of the 4-1-4 
split, it was probably not a controlling opinion.  First, any negative 
inference that the Court drew due to the fact that the Corps had 
not changed their regulation is seemingly unjustified because the 
Court had not provided a clear test in SWANCC.  Second, the 
plurality’s introduction of the continuous flow and continuous 
surface connection requirements are unwarranted because 
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nowhere in the legislation or the case law do these terms appear; 
they are completely novel concepts created by the plurality, as 
Justice Kennedy indicated in his opinion.  Third, subjecting every 
statutory word to close dictionary and lexicographic “scrutiny” does 
no justice to the very real problems addressed by the CWA and that 
the plurality passed over (or criticized others for considering in 
their opinions).  Fourth, the plurality’s excision and separation of 
“point source” and “navigable waters” goes against canons of 
construction that require that definitional terms be read in 
connection and as complimentary to one another whenever 
possible; these terms are simply definitional analogs relating to the 
areas where toxins and dredged/fill material, respectively, are 
deposited, and any suggestion that one is more important or more 
worthy of regulation than the other is at odds with the generally 
accepted ecological perspective.  And fifth, the plurality’s over-
reliance on SWANCC and misinterpretation of Riverside Bayview 
focuses too heavily on a questionable decision five years ago and 
largely ignores the other 100 years of progressive precedent and 
legislative and administrative action. 
So if in fact SWANCC and Rapanos were wrongly decided as this 
article suggests, what is the proper solution to restore the Corps’s 
and the judiciary’s power as it stood before 2001?  First of all, it is 
clear that, at least with the current composition, the Supreme 
Court is unable to provide concrete guidance on how to regulate 
wetlands.  SWANCC was sparsely reasoned and did not provide any 
kind of future guidance.  Rapanos did not even command a 
majority of the Court, resulting in three long, contradictory 
opinions.  Therefore, the Court should refrain from accepting any 
section 404 cases for at least a decade, until the courts of appeals 
have had time to flesh out the current state of the law.  As most 
courts seem to be following Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos 
and construing SWANCC narrowly, if the Supreme Court recuses 
itself from this debate for a while, the future of wetlands will be 
bright because most wetlands that were previously regulated likely 
also fall within the “significant nexus.”234  The trend of liberal 
jurisdictional expansion, however, will be difficult to continue for 
the same reasons. 
Second, Congress should act to clarify what it intended the 
Corps’s jurisdiction to be under the CWA.  The CWA has been on 
                                                          
 234. All that would be needed is for the Fifth Circuit to get on board with the 
rest of the circuit courts of appeals. 
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the books for over thirty-five years, and a comprehensive 
amendment or clarification is becoming quickly overdue.  Senator 
Russell Feingold of Wisconsin introduced a bill in the 2005 
legislative session entitled the Clean Water Authority Restoration 
Act.235  This act would do exactly what is needed in the area of 
wetlands regulation consistent with the original purposes of the 
CWA, but with the added benefit of eliminating any possibility of 
argument against full exercise of the Corps’s authority under the 
Constitution.  The effect of this bill, if passed, would be to 
completely supersede SWANCC and Rapanos, and it would restore 
the law to where it was in the late 1990s, but without the critics and 
dissenting opinions.  It also has the added benefit of continual 
expansion of regulation over time, parallel to the probable 
expansion of congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause.236 
Third, until Senator Feingold’s legislation is (hopefully) 
passed,237 the Corps should slightly modify section 328.3(a) 
regulations to exclude only those most objectionable aqueous 
conduits over which the Corps had previously asserted jurisdiction 
in order to avoid tempting the court system to rule against them, as 
in Rapanos.  If the Corps, for the time being, shows that it is willing 
to at least appear to be complying with the mandates set forth by 
the judiciary, judges will have less incentive and less reason to 
criticize the Corps’s conduct.  After all, if Rapanos stands for 
anything at all, it is that the Court was unhappy with the fact that 
the Corps was still operating under the same regulations five years 
                                                          
 235. S. 912, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).  The purposes of this act are as follows: 
(1) To reaffirm the original intent of Congress in enacting the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of 
the United States. 
(2) To clearly define the waters of the United States that are subject to 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
(3) To provide protection to the waters of the United States to the fullest 
extent of the legislative authority of Congress under the Constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The act then goes on to specify provisions to meet each of 
these goals.  Id. § 3. 
 236. See PRENTICE & EGAN, supra note 46.  But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (recognizing that the Interstate Commerce Clause is not 
omnipotent, and that there still remain many areas of the law where federal 
regulation is not proper). 
 237. In January 2007, the Democratic Party took control of the Congress, 
making it more likely that a proposal such as this will be passed, or at least 
considered. 
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after SWANCC. 
In conclusion, wetlands regulation will continue to be an 
important issue that affects everyone—from permitting 
requirements to drinking water quality.  Wherever the state of the 
law goes from here, it should keep in mind the purposes for which 
the original laws were enacted and the overarching theme of the 
need for strong environmental protection at the federal level, and 
it should strive for realization of the no-net-loss policy.  With any 
luck, wetlands will be around for a long time to come to prevent 
the spread of pollution, to mitigate flooding, and to provide 
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